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1243 
STRAIGHT TO VIDEO: AMERICA’S 
INMATES DEPRIVED OF A LIFELINE 
THROUGH VIDEO-ONLY VISITS 
Abstract: The ability of inmates in the United States to visit with loved ones is 
often severely limited by correctional officials, and the courts have been reluc-
tant to intervene. Recently, those officials have begun to replace in-person visit-
ation with video visitation. This Note argues that such a transition will be harm-
ful for inmates, correctional institutions, and the communities many of them 
eventually return to. It also suggests possible jurisprudential, legislative, and 
regulatory interventions to curtail the replacement of in-person visitation. 
Those whom we would banish from society or from the human community 
itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society’s demand 
for punishment. 
—McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (Brennan J., dissenting) 
INTRODUCTION 
Tiffany Burns looked forward to visiting Chrishon Brown, her boyfriend 
of two years, in jail while he was awaiting trial in the Jefferson Parish Correc-
tional Center, near New Orleans, Louisiana.1 Although she drove more than 
an hour in traffic to see him and their visits occurred through a glass partition, 
the visits were free, and she sometimes forgot about the glass and felt like 
they were “together again.”2 On October 12, 2017, however, she was together 
with Chrishon for the last time until his release.3 As she left the visiting room 
she was given a pamphlet which proclaimed, “Visit an inmate from any-
where!”4 Despite its ebullience, the pamphlet announced the jail’s new policy 
prohibiting Tiffany from visiting Chrishon in person.5 Under the new regime, 
Tiffany would pay $12.99 for a 20 minute remote video visit.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Shannon Sims, The End of American Prison Visits: Jails End Face-to-Face Contact—and 
Families Suffer, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/
09/skype-for-jailed-video-calls-prisons-replace-in-person-visits [https://perma.cc/5ADG-GWW6] 
(reporting that Tiffany was happy to visit Chrishon in jail). Chrishon was accused of robbing a 
bank. Id. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. The Jefferson Parish sheriff justified the new policy on the grounds that it would reduce 
correctional resources spent on visitation. Id. Under the new policy, the county offers one free 
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Unfortunately, Tiffany and Chrishon’s story is not unique.7 Replacing in-
person visitation with video visitation, the Jefferson Parish Correctional Cen-
ter joined a growing trend among correctional facilities across the United 
States.8 Three-quarters of U.S. jails that introduce video visitation eliminate 
in-person visitation.9 
The United States imprisons more individuals per capita than any other 
country in the world, in part because incarceration no longer serves its origi-
nal purposes.10 During the colonial period prisons and jails temporarily con-
fined witnesses and the accused who were awaiting trial, and the convicted 
who were awaiting imposition of a sentence.11 But in the late 1700s, impris-
onment replaced corporal castigation and death as the primary method of 
punishment.12 Today’s jails primarily serve two functions: holding inmates 
                                                                                                                           
video visit per week at an offsite location. Id. Video visits may also occur via a smartphone or 
computer; however, loved ones without access to such technology must visit inmates at the offsite 
location. Id. 
 7 See, e.g., Howard Hardee, Fighting for Face Time, NEWSREVIEW.COM (June 27, 2013), http://
www.newsreview.com/chico/fighting-for-face-time/content?oid=10378841 [https://perma.cc/J9JR-
A8GP] (documenting the experience of an inmate’s loved one cut off from seeing him in person 
because of a new policy replacing in-person visitation with video visitation); Jessica Robinson, In-
mates’ Families Say They’re the Ones Punished by Switch to Video Visits, NW NEWS NETWORK (June 
3, 2013), http://nwnewsnetwork.org/post/inmates-families-say-theyre-ones-punished-switch-video-
visits [https://perma.cc/YHM2-VHFV] (noting the experience of an inmate who struggled to have a 
video visit with his granddaughter due to technical issues). 
 8 See BERNADETTE RABUY & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, SCREENING OUT 
FAMILY TIME: THE FOR-PROFIT VIDEO VISITATION INDUSTRY IN PRISONS AND JAILS 11 (2015), 
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/ScreeningOutFamilyTime_January2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/U99R-CGC8] (noting that seventy-four percent of jails that adopt video visitation then elimi-
nate in-person visitation). 
 9 Id. This Note only discusses inmate visitation with family and friends, not lawyers or clergy. 
 10 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate Than Any Other Coun-
try, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/?utm_
term=.e5d86c6d6081 [https://perma.cc/B77Y-543L]; see Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional 
Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 409, 414 (1983) (noting that incarceration in colonial America was not originally 
intended as punishment). The United States has less than 5% of the world’s population, but around 
25% of the world’s incarcerated population. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass 
Incarceration, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/
the-black-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/7KPY-N2J2]. 
 11 Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 450 (2005); 
see Leverson, supra note 10, at 412, 413, 414 (detailing the history of such practices in England 
and Colonial America). Punishment typically involved a fine, exile, bodily suffering, or death. 
Dolovich, supra, at 450. In the New York colony, for example, only nineteen individuals were 
sentenced to incarceration between 1691 and 1776. Leverson, supra note 10, at 414. 
 12 Leverson, supra note 10, at 415. Two theories on prison operation emerged, the “silent 
system” and the “congregate system.” Id. at 415, 417. The Pennsylvania legislature embraced the 
“silent system” in 1896, in response to calls from Quaker reformers. Id. at 415. The “congregate 
system,” was adopted in 1816 in New York. Id. at 417. Under either, separation, silence, and re-
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for short periods of time before trial or sentencing, and housing inmates serv-
ing shorter sentences, often less than a year long.13 Modern prisons house 
inmates who are given lengthier sentences, typically longer than a year.14 
Although the United States moved to an incarceration-based system of 
punishment two centuries ago, a significant number of individuals were not 
incarcerated until relatively recently.15 Over the past forty years, the prison 
and jail population swelled by five hundred percent.16 The government re-
sponded to a crime wave that began in the 1960s by commencing the War on 
Drugs, which institutionalized the racist law and order rhetoric that had 
emerged in the 1950s in response to the Civil Rights Movement.17 This reac-
                                                                                                                           
flection, not visitation, were mainstays of an inmate’s life. See id. at 416−17 (noting that under 
both systems silence and separation were predominate characteristics). 
 13 FAQ Detail: What Is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 [https://perma.cc/AW4C-3SGY]. Although 
definitions vary by state, the crimes that land someone in jail are typically misdemeanors. Id. The 
majority of the jail population, however, is awaiting trial, and has not been adjudicated guilty of 
any crime. DREW KUKOROWSKI ET AL., PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, PLEASE DEPOSIT ALL OF 
YOUR MONEY: KICKBACKS, RATES, AND HIDDEN FEES IN THE JAIL PHONE INDUSTRY 4 (2013), 
http://static.prisonpolicy.org/phones/please_deposit.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7YQ-FCRQ]. 
 14 FAQ Detail: What Is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?, supra note 13. This Note 
will use the term “inmates” to refer generally to those incarcerated in prisons and jails. 
 15 See PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RACE OF PRISONERS ADMITTED TO 
STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1926−86, at 4 (1991), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
125618.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C3G-5ZQD] (documenting the rising number of individuals incar-
cerated in state and federal prisons from 1926 to 1986); Leverson, supra note 10, at 415 (noting 
that the United States moved to an incarceration-based system of punishment in the late 1700s). In 
1926, just over forty-eight thousand individuals were admitted to federal and state prisons. LAN-
GAN, supra, at 4. By 1986, the number had risen to 219,382. Id. 
 16 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2018), https://
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FB65-2H9G]. 
 17 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 40−58 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the connections between the political debates 
and decisions surrounding the War on Drugs and the following increase in law enforcement budg-
ets and incarcerated population); Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime 
Across Space and Time, 33 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1 (2005) (noting that crime rates rose during the 
1960s through the 1990s, and incarceration rates rose during the 1970s through the 2000s). Presi-
dent Nixon called for a war on drugs in the 1960s, but it was not until 1982 that President Reagan 
officially launched the War on Drugs. ALEXANDER, supra, at 48, 49. Conservatives, particularly 
in Southern states that were battling segregation, linked the lack of law and order to the civil diso-
bedience encouraged by the Civil Rights Movement. Id. at 40−41. Both Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations, with support from some of the Black community, enacted legislation 
providing for more law enforcement resources to fight drug crimes and for increasingly harsher 
penalties for drug violations. Id. at 53, 56; see JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 31 (2017) (documenting the anti-drug support in 
factions of the Black community). Although the language initiating and justifying the War on 
Drugs was couched in race-neutral terms, the effects were disproportionately borne by blacks, 
despite there being no difference in illegal drug use and sale between races. ALEXANDER, supra, 
at 48, 56, 99. Young whites, for example, are admitted to emergency rooms for drug-related rea-
sons three times more often than young black Americans. Id. at 99. Before the 1960s, blacks were 
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tion is largely responsible for the drastic increase in incarcerated individuals 
in general, and of black Americans in particular.18 Today, the federal and state 
governments incarcerate more than 2.2 million individuals.19 
Incarceration is often expensive for inmates and their families, and can 
also take a hefty psychological toll.20 Americans sent to prison tend to be 
poor.21 The median income of someone who is sentenced to incarceration is 
nearly half that of someone who is not.22 Being behind bars then places addi-
tional financial strains on already destitute inmates and their families.23 Fed-
eral and state governments spend around eighty billion dollars per year on 
incarceration, and subsidize the cost by levying fees on those who are brought 
into the system.24 It also often leads to negative psychological impacts be-
                                                                                                                           
imprisoned at a rate four times greater than whites. ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE 
RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE 2−3 (2010). Today, decades after the Civil Rights Move-
ment, blacks are incarcerated at seven times the rate of whites. Id. at 2−3. 
 18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 98 (finding that War on Drugs law enforcement tactics 
were used “almost exclusively in poor communities of color” leading to high incarceration rates 
for members of those communities). Before the War on Drugs in 1974, a black man had a 13.4% 
chance of being incarcerated. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974−2001, at 8 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SG9-SBRQ]. By 2001, the number had risen to 32.2%, 
while a white man had a 5.9% chance. Id. In 2015, over 35% of the American prison population 
was black, while 33% was white. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 5. Black men, 
however, were in prison at a rate of 2,613 people per 100,000. Id. The number for white men was 
457 per 100,000. Id. Today, one in six black men has been to prison, whereas only one in thirty-
nine white men has had a similar experience. PERKINSON, supra note 17, at 2. 
 19 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 2. This number belies the true number—six 
million—of individuals under some form of government supervision, which includes incarcera-
tion, parole, or probation. Id. 
 20 ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCAR-
CERATION ON FAMILIES 11 (2015), https://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-
pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q4J-WS6F] (concluding that incarceration adversely affects inmates’ 
and their families’ health, finances, and relationships); Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of 
Incarceration, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 
ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 33, 37–38 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul, eds. 
2003) (describing the long-term psychological suffering experienced by inmates). 
 21 Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 
2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/5AYC-4FZ4]. About 
eighty percent of criminal defendants are deemed indigent by courts. PERKINSON, supra note 17, 
at 2. 
 22 Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 21. The median income, in 2014 dollars, for an incarcerated 
man was $19,650, while the median income for a man who was not incarcerated was $41,250. Id. 
The process of being convicted can cost a defendant, on average, $13,607. ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 13. This figure includes attorney’s fees and restitution. Id. 
 23 ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 11. Following a family mem-
ber’s incarceration, two in three families struggle to meet their basic needs. Id. at 13. 
 24 Id. at 12. The growth rates of state correctional budgets have outpaced those of education, 
transportation, and public assistance. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG 
REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11 (2009), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/
03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4P2-WBJN]. Incarceration is 
also expensive for taxpayers. See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T 
2019] Video-Only Prison Visits 1247 
cause inmates become institutionalized, a condition characterized by hyper-
vigilance and social withdrawal.25 
Free, in-person visitation can alleviate some of the strain created by in-
carceration by helping inmates remain directly connected to their loved ones, 
increasing their employment prospects, and decreasing recidivism.26 It can 
also improve the internal security of correctional facilities.27 But the availa-
bility of in-person visitation is jeopardized when jails and prisons implement 
video visitation.28 Correctional officials in many jails and at least one prison 
are replacing in-person visitation with video visitation, whereby inmates in-
teract with their loved ones over the Internet through video-chat.29 Although 
in-person visitation is usually free, video visitation can be costly and plagued 
by technological glitches that render the service not only frustrating but inef-
fective.30 The replacement of in-person visitation with video visitation threat-
                                                                                                                           
OF JUSTICE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES, FY 2005−2011, at 3 (2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lgcefy0511.pdf [https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lgcefy
0511.pdf] (finding that correctional facilities cost local communities over twenty-two billion dol-
lars in 2011). 
 25 Haney, supra note 20, at 80−84 (describing possible psychological consequences of incar-
ceration). About half of prison inmates are “functionally illiterate.” PERKINSON, supra note 17, at 
2. 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(7) (2012) (stating that inmates reentering the community cite family 
support as crucial to staying out of prison) (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 60501); CHRISTY VISHER ET 
AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., RETURNING HOME: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES 
OF PRISONER REENTRY 2 (2004), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42841/410974-
Returning-Home-Understanding-the-Challenges-of-Prisoner-Reentry.PDF [https://perma.cc/8FK7-
C5Y3] (reporting a study finding that many inmates returning home found jobs and financial sup-
port through family and friends); Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Buebner, Reentry and the Ties That 
Bind: An Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 397 (2011) 
(noting that employed ex-inmates are less likely to recidivate). 
 27 See 42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(6) (stating that inmates who remain connected to loved ones 
while incarcerated are less likely to have “negative incidents”) (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 60501); 
Sonja E. Siennick et al., Here and Gone: Anticipation and Separation Effects on Prison Visits on 
Inmate Infraction, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 417, 435 (2013) (finding that in the weeks leading 
up to an in-person visit the probability of an inmate committing a facility infraction decreased). 
 28 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that seventy-four percent of jails that 
institute video visitation subsequently eliminate in-person visitation). 
 29 See id. at 11 & n.31 (reporting that one prison and seventy-four percent of jails that have 
adopted video visitation have eliminated in-person visitation); Patrice A. Fulcher, The Double-
Edged Sword of Prison Video Visitation: Claiming to Keep Families Together While Furthering 
the Aims of the Prison Industrial Complex, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 83, 94−96 (2013) (docu-
menting the replacement of in-person visitation with video visitation at two separate county jail 
facilities). 
 30 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that in-person visitation is traditionally 
free). But see, e.g., Erica Goode, Inmate Visits Now Carry Added Cost in Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/us/05prison.html [https://perma.cc/FX7P-RKF7] 
(reporting that the Arizona Department of Corrections charges visitors a one-time twenty-five 
dollar fee for a background check). 
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ens the benefits of in-person visits, and resembles slavery-era practices.31 If 
used at all, video visitation should be offered in addition to, not instead of, in-
person visitation.32 
Part I of this Note details the history of visitation in U.S. correctional fa-
cilities, the psychological, safety, and recidivism implications of inmate visit-
ation, the involvement of private companies in public corrections, and the 
recent development of video visitation technology.33 Part II examines the his-
tory of inmates’ constitutional claims before the U.S. Supreme Court, as well 
as legislative and regulatory efforts to moderate inmate video visitation.34 
Part III argues that in-person visitation should not be replaced with video vis-
itation and considers judicial, legislative, and regulatory approaches to ad-
dress such detrimental change.35 
I. INMATE VISITATION HISTORICALLY, PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
IN-PERSON VISITATION, AND PRIVATIZED VIDEO VISITATION 
Section A of this Part describes the historical development of inmate vis-
itation.36 Section B details research regarding the benefits of in-person visita-
tion.37 Section C explains the privatization of the prison phone industry.38 
Section D concludes by portraying the current video visitation landscape in 
correctional facilities.39 
A. The Historical Context of Inmate Visitation 
In the colonial period, jails and prisons were open to the public and later 
to inspectors because judges, prison founders, reformers, and administrators 
believed that transparency would prevent inmate abuse.40 Such public visits 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See, e.g., BRENDA E. STEVENSON, LIFE IN BLACK AND WHITE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY 
IN THE SLAVE SOUTH 206, 221 (1996) (detailing how slave owners could control minute aspects 
of slaves’ intimate lives); Siennick, supra note 27, at 429 (finding that the anticipation of an in-
person visit can decrease the probability that an inmate violates correctional facility rules). 
 32 See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 112 (advocating for video visitation to be offered in addition 
to in-person visitation). 
 33 See infra notes 36−113 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 114−190 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 191−255 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 40−49 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 50−65 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 66−83 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 84−113 and accompanying text. 
 40 Leverson, supra note 10, at 409, 416, 420, 422−23. In 1770, one New York inmate had so 
many visitors that the prison established visiting hours for the influx of friends wishing to see him. 
Id. at 414 n.23. United States Attorney General William Bradford, who previously served as a 
justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, noted the importance of jails and prisons being “easily 
accessible” to inspection. Id. at 416. A New York prison warden, and former state judge, wrote to 
the New York Legislature in 1828 commenting that public exposure of prisons had a positive 
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were accepted by prison officials despite the burden they placed on correc-
tional staff.41 As the purpose of incarceration shifted from confinement to 
punishment, open public scrutiny was replaced by a procedure of official in-
spection.42 Nevertheless, although the U.S. Supreme Court has never held 
that inmates have a right to such visitation, prisons and jails today generally 
allow family and friends to visit inmates.43  
In the view of some, incarceration has historically been—among other 
things—a tool of racial control and suppression rooted in slavery.44 Restrict-
ing or eliminating in-person visitation echoes practices employed by slave 
owners, who not only separated slaves from their family members but con-
trolled their intimate lives.45 Although slave owners claimed that their goal 
was to keep families together, when profit was at issue they did not hesitate to 
                                                                                                                           
effect on convicts and prison officers, ensuring that both performed their respective duties. Id. at 
422−23. In 1980, Chief Justice Burger, in a case holding that criminal trials must be open to the 
public, wrote for a plurality of the Supreme Court that the “appearance of justice” is served by 
allowing the public to observe the criminal process. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 571−72 (1980) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 384 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
 41 See Leverson, supra note 10, at 415, 421 (documenting the experience of New York prison 
administrators who were unwilling to risk a lawsuit by preventing a visitor from entering a facili-
ty, and noting that “[t]ens of thousands of citizens, and many foreigners as well” thronged to visit 
houses of confinement). 
 42 Id. at 415−17. Public inspection turned out to be a better bulwark against abuses of prison-
ers than official oversight. Id. at 421. In certain Southern prisons, for example, where public ac-
cess was completely forbidden, prisoners were electrocuted for infractions or placed in solitary 
confinement without access to running water and fed one meal per day. Id. at 427−28. 
 43 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (refusing to hold that any right to inti-
mate contact is terminated by imprisonment); Leverson, supra note 10, at 429 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has never decided whether there is a public right to access prisons because liti-
gants have never presented it). See generally Chesa Boudin et al., Prison Visitation Policies: A 
Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2013) (describing various visitation policies in 
United States correctional facilities). 
 44 See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
237, 255 (2009) [hereinafter Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style] (noting that “morality has 
replaced slavery’s use of biology” as the factor legitimizing social control of blacks, that the cate-
gory of “inmate” in the United States is racialized, and that it is difficult not to notice the nexus 
between the emergence of the modern prison and the “political imperative of controlling newly 
freed Blacks”); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 330 (2010) 
(noting that commentators suggest that the “prison-industrial complex” helps maintain racial sub-
ordination, and commenting that prison and jail regulation amounts to a regressive policy that 
significantly affects poor and minority communities). See generally Coates, supra note 10 (detail-
ing the connections between slavery, the incarceration of black men, and social control). The Su-
preme Court of Virginia exposed the true nature of incarceration, noting, six years after the con-
clusion of the Civil War, that a prisoner is a “slave of the State.” Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 
(21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). 
 45 See STEVENSON, supra note 31, at 206 (documenting the sales practices of slave owners in 
Loudoun County, Virginia that destroyed slave family networks, and slave owners’ ability to con-
trol their slaves’ intimate associations). George Washington, for example, had a practice of dis-
persing slave families far away from each other. Id. at 211. Slave owners controlled various as-
pects of slaves’ sexual and familial lives through lawmaking powers. Id. at 221. 
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break them apart.46 Slave owners did not view slaves as capable of forming 
real familial bonds.47 In language that mirrors the Supreme Court standard for 
assessing constitutional claims made by inmates, Thomas Jefferson wrote that 
he only respected “connections seriously formed by those people” if he could 
do so “reasonably.”48 When prison officials restrict or eliminate the ability of 
inmates to see their loved ones in person, they act in the long shadow of slav-
ery.49 
B. Research on the Benefits of In-Person Visitation 
Correctional facilities essentially store people.50 They are inherently 
stressful and contentious environments from which in-person visitation can 
provide relief.51 A breadth of psychological research supports the notion that 
seeing loved ones face to face is beneficial for psychological health.52 Having 
strong relationships can help an individual bear the burdens of, and improve 
through, experiences of stress.53 
Research has documented the benefits that direct contact with family 
and friends has on inmates.54 Inmates who receive more monthly visits tend 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See WILMA A. DUNAWAY, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND EMANCI-
PATION 51 (2003) (finding that in many cases masters would only keep families together if there 
were no economic implications). 
 47 Id. at 53. 
 48 Id. at 52; see Overton, 539 U.S. at 133 (upholding prison policies curtailing inmate visita-
tion in part because the restrictions were “reasonable”). 
 49 See DUNAWAY, supra note 46, at 63 (describing the practice of “abroad spouses,” who 
belonged to different owners and could only meet at predetermined times); STEVENSON, supra 
note 31, at 221 (noting that slave owners controlled numerous aspects of a slave’s “sexual behav-
ior and family life”). 
 50 Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction to THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 13, 13, 15 
(Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, eds., 1982) (commenting that the two main goals of prisons are 
punishment and deterrence, and that the “bottom line” of incarceration is storage); see Dolovich, 
Incarceration American-Style, supra note 44, at 253 (noting that the penal system long ago aban-
doned rehabilitation). 
 51 See Johnson & Toch, supra note 50, at 19 (describing prison environments as hostile and 
indifferent); John D. Wooldredge, Inmate Experiences and Psychological Well-Being, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 235, 244 (1999) (finding that visitation can help inmates feel less depressed, 
anxious, and stressed). 
 52 See, e.g., SUSAN PINKER, THE VILLAGE EFFECT: HOW FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT CAN 
MAKE US HEALTHIER, HAPPIER, AND SMARTER 9 (2014) (noting the critical importance in-person 
communication and that it affects thought and trust processes). 
 53 Brooke C. Feeney & Nancy L. Collins, A Theoretical Perspective on the Importance of 
Social Connections for Thriving, in MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONNECTION 291, 297 (Mario 
Mikulincer & Philip R. Shaver eds., 2014). 
 54 See Wooldredge, supra note 51, at 244 (finding that inmates tend to have worse psycholog-
ical outcomes when they are visited less); see also Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 
2000) (noting that visits are of great value to inmates and those who visit them). Inmates are more 
likely to become agitated when they experience less social stimulation. Wooldredge, supra note 
51, at 235−36. Indeed, many criminological theories rely on an individual’s social bonds and sup-
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to be less depressed, anxious, and stressed.55 By providing them an oppor-
tunity to connect with loved ones, visitation can also increase inmates’ likeli-
hood to follow facility rules.56 One study found that in the weeks leading up 
to a visit the probability of an inmate breaking one of those rules decreased.57 
This occurred regardless of the type of visitor the inmate received, for exam-
ple a relative as opposed to a friend.58 Inmates who received frequent visits 
were generally less likely to break a rule than those who were visited less fre-
quently.59 In-person visitation, then, can bolster correctional facility safety.60 
Research also links in-person visitation with positive outcomes for in-
mates once they return to their communities.61 Recidivism is a problem for 
the correctional system; approximately two-thirds of inmates are rearrested 
within three years of their release.62 Research suggests that inmates who are 
visited frequently and experience higher levels of social support have a de-
creased risk of recidivism than those visited less.63 One study found that in-
mates who were visited had an approximately thirty percent lower chance of 
                                                                                                                           
ports to explain criminal behavior. Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, Blessed Be the Social Tie That 
Binds: The Effects of Prison Visitation on Offender Recidivism, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 271, 
274−75 (2013) (describing theories that involve social supports). 
 55 Wooldredge, supra note 51, at 244. This study examined self-reported data from inmates in 
three Ohio prisons. Id. at 240. 
 56 Siennick, supra note 27, at 419, 435; see JORGE ANTONIO RENAUD, GRASSROOTS LEAD-
ERSHIP, VIDEO VISITATION: HOW PRIVATE COMPANIES PUSH FOR VISITS BY VIDEO AND FAMI-
LIES PAY THE PRICE 4 (2014) (noting that disciplinary infractions at the Travis County, Texas jail 
increased when in-person visitation was replaced with video visitation). Prison rule-breaking pos-
es a significant problem for prisons. See Siennick, supra note 27, at 429 (noting that in 2000, in-
mates committed over 1.7 million infractions). 
 57 Siennick, supra note 27, at 435. This study analyzed the number of weekly infractions and 
visits for 7,787 inmates incarcerated in Florida between 2000 and 2002. Id. at 424−25. Although 
visit-anticipation is related to a lower probability of an inmate committing an infraction, after the 
visit occurs the likelihood of an inmate committing an infraction increases before returning to 
baseline. Id. at 435. Perhaps this is because, although feelings of agitation are assuaged in antici-
pation of social connection, they return with force following separation from loved ones. Id. at 
437. 
 58 Id. at 433−34. 
 59 Id. at 434. This may be due to inmates’ hesitation to imperil their visitation privileges by 
committing an infraction close to a visit. Id. at 437. 
 60 Id. at 435. 
 61 See William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the Transition to Society: 
Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 304 (2008) (finding that 
visitation reduces the chances of recidivism by up to thirty percent); Duwe & Clark, supra note 
54, at 289 (concluding that visitation decreases the risk of recidivism for felony offense and tech-
nical violations). 
 62 Duwe & Clark, supra note 54, at 272. One issue driving the large rates of recidivism is that 
former inmates, while on supervised release, can be rearrested and incarcerated for behavior that is 
not criminal, like consuming alcohol. Id. at 278. 
 63 Id. at 289. This study examined 16,410 inmates released from Minnesota prisons between 
2003 and 2007. Id. at 272. On average the researchers followed offenders for almost five years to 
examine recidivism rates. Id.  
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recidivism than those who were not visited, with a per-visit reduction in the 
probability of recidivism of almost four percent.64 In-person visitation thus 
increases an inmate’s prospect of leading a crime-free life upon release.65 
C. Correctional Privatization and the Correctional Phone Industry 
Private companies have often been involved with corrections in the 
United States.66 After the Civil War ended, states provided inmates as unpaid 
laborers to private contractors in a practice known as convict leasing.67 Later, 
to manage the influx of inmates following the War on Drugs, correctional 
officials again turned to the private sector.68 States initially attempted to 
house growing numbers of inmates in existing facilities.69 But overcrowding 
led to court orders requiring states to rapidly increase the number of correc-
tional facilities; to help meet the demand, private companies entered the fray, 
building and running entire prisons.70 In the 1980s, there were approximately 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Bales & Mears, supra note 61, at 304−05. This study examined seven thousand inmates in 
Florida, released between 2001 and 2002, who served at least twelve-month sentences. Id. They 
were followed after release for two years. Id. Thirty-one percent of inmates reoffended within two 
years of being released. Id.. It is possible that visits reduce the chances of recidivism by keeping 
inmates connected to community members who can soothe inmates’ transition back to society and 
help them find, among other things, employment and housing. See Duwe & Clark, supra note 54, 
at 275 (noting that family and friends help inmates returning to society overcome unemployment 
and homelessness). Receiving visitors may also help inmates maintain their familial and commu-
nity roles, and generally allow inmates to be more optimistic about their return to society. See 
Joshua C. Cochran, The Ties That Bind or the Ties That Break: Examining the Relationship Be-
tween Visitation and Prisoner Misconduct, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 433, 438 (2012) (suggesting that 
visitation may allow inmates to maintain their community roles and remain optimistic about their 
return to society). 
 65 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.8031(1) (West 2010) (stating that visitation can “improve an 
inmate’s behavior in the correctional facility and . . . help to reduce recidivism”); Bales & Mears, 
supra note 61, at 304 (concluding that increased visitation can reduce recidivism). 
 66 See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 451 (describing the postbellum involvement of companies 
with corrections); Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison 
Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 597 (2012) [hereinafter Fulcher, Hustle and Flow] 
(describing the involvement of private companies to help address rising numbers of inmates). 
 67 Dolovich, supra note 11, at 451. Convict leasing was prevalent in the South to mitigate the 
negative economic effects caused by the dearth of free labor following the end of slavery. Id. at 
451. States entered into contracts with private parties, who treated individual inmates as disposa-
ble, because if one died another would be brought to replace him. Id. at 451−52. 
 68 See id. at 439 (noting that governments turned to the private sector when inmate popula-
tions “soared” during the 1980s and 1990s); Fulcher, Hustle and Flow, supra note 66, at 597 (not-
ing that governments turned to private companies after prison populations “exploded” from drug 
law modifications). Relying on the private sector for incarceration services was not an innovation; 
federal immigration services had been relying on private contractors to run detention facilities 
since the 1970s. Dolovich, supra note 11, at 457. 
 69 Dolovich, supra note 11, at 455. 
 70 See id. at 455−57 (describing how overcrowding led to court orders mandating that states 
increase their correctional capacities, which lead to private companies managing new facilities). 
The first private prison company to enter the market was Corrections Corporation of America in 
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three thousand inmates in private prisons worldwide.71 By 2015, the number 
had increased to one hundred twenty-six thousand inmates in the United 
States alone, representing approximately eight percent of the total number of 
U.S. inmates.72 The private sector has also extended its reach into publicly 
run correctional facilities through various methods, one of which is by con-
tracting with them to operate their telephone systems.73 
The correctional phone industry provides revenue for companies and 
correctional facilities while imposing high costs on inmates and their fami-
lies.74 It is worth $1.2 billion per year with two companies, Securus and 
Global Tel*Link, controlling 80% of the market.75 Correctional institutions 
enter into exclusive contracts with prison operations companies to provide 
inmate calling services, and the companies transfer a portion of the revenue to 
the correctional facilities in the form of commissions.76 The companies then 
have a captive market; the inmates and their loved ones have no ability to 
                                                                                                                           
1983. Id. at 459. Since then, it has brought in billions of dollars in annual revenue. Fulcher, Hustle 
and Flow, supra note 66, at 602. The typical prison contract pays the company a per diem rate for 
every inmate held. Id. at 599. Although no longer called convict leasing, private prison companies 
continue to employ the labor of inmates for profit. Fulcher, supra note 29, at 107. 
 71 Fulcher, Hustle and Flow, supra note 66, at 598. 
 72 E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2015, at 16 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PT7L-FC9Q]. With economic motivation to increase the correctional population, these 
private companies donate money to politicians and campaigns aimed at passing “tough on crime” 
laws. See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 107 (noting that harsh laws lead to larger inmate populations, 
causing correctional institutions to enter contracts with private companies to store inmates). 
 73 See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRIS-
ON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [https://
perma.cc/57DS-R7RK] (noting that private companies provide inmates with goods through com-
missaries and provide telephone services). 
 74 See KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (reporting the high price of correctional 
phone calls and facilities’ commissions systems). 
 75 See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 108−09 (reporting that Securus and Global Tel*Link control 
eighty percent of the market); Sims, supra note 1 (reporting that the industry is worth $1.2 billion 
annually). In February 2017, Securus was bought by Platinum Equity LLC for $1.6 billion, twice 
the amount of the company’s 2012 valuation. Victoria Law, Prison Video Visits Are No Substitute 
for Face-to-Face, Especially at These Prices, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-02/prison-video-visits-are-no-substitute-for-face-to-face-
especially-at-these-prices [https://perma.cc/WQ87-SEAC]. Global Tel*Link, after being outbid for 
the contract to service the Los Angeles County Jail phone system, bought the company that won 
the bid. David Lazarus, Gouging L.A. County Inmates with High Phone Fees, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20140909-column.html [https://perma.cc/
T8ED-9RST]. 
 76 See KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (describing the contractual process). In 2012, 
Pennsylvania, for example, received $6.9 million in revenue from inmate phone calls. Andrew 
McGill, Talk Is Anything but Cheap from Jail, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 21, 2013), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/region/2013/07/21/Talk-is-anything-but-cheap-from-jail/stories/2013
07210268 [https://perma.cc/9C9Q-4W2P]. Calls related to prison operations, like booking, are 
provided for “free,” however that cost is passed onto the consumers: inmates and their families. 
KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 6. 
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engage with competition.77 Also, the interests of prison officials choosing a 
contract and pricing scheme are at odds with those who pay for the phone 
calls.78 The former seeks a high commission, the latter an inexpensive method 
to contact a family member or friend.79 Furthermore, in order to remain prof-
itable, correctional phone companies charge a litany of ancillary fees to place 
calls.80 This results in astronomical prices: a fifteen minute call can cost over 
seventeen dollars.81 Such high prices can deter family communication.82 The 
prison phone industry has laid the foundation for video visitation, which pri-
vate companies are beginning to offer inmates at similarly exorbitant prices.83 
D. Video Visitation in Correctional Facilities 
Video chat and conference technology has begun to pervade the Ameri-
can legal system, including the nation’s correctional facilities.84 Although no 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (ex-
plaining that once a company is awarded a contract competition ceases and it has a “local mono-
pol[y]”). 
 78 See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 27 FCC Rcd. 16,629, 16,662 (2012) 
(statement of Pai, Comm’r) (commenting that correctional officials who select a contract have 
different incentives than inmates). Correctional officials are incentivized to choose the contract 
with the highest commission to maximize the facility’s financial yield. KUKOROWSKI ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 3. These fees are passed onto the inmates and their families. Id. 
 79 See Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 404 (noting that correctional institutions “give considera-
ble weight” to which company will provide the largest commission); KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 3 (noting that inmates may not select a carrier with the lowest rate). In 2007, Dane 
County, Wisconsin passed an ordinance requiring that jail phone contracts not generate revenue 
for the county in the form of a commission, and be awarded to the lowest bidder. Wisconsin Coun-
ty Bans Profiteering in Jail Phone Contracts, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 15, 2008), https://
www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2008/jul/15/wisconsin-county-bans-profiteering-in-jail-phone-
contracts/ [https://perma.cc/SXB7-CQG4]. Before the ordinance was passed, a fifteen-minute call 
cost an inmate $11.75. Id. The county brought in nearly one million dollars of revenue under the 
discontinued commission system. Id. 
 80 KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 7−9 (listing and describing various fees callers are 
charged). There are fees to open an account with the company, fees for holding money in the ac-
count, fees to return deposited money that will not be used, and fees for paying through a money 
service like Western Union. Id. Experts estimate that families spend a combined $386 million 
annually on fees alone. Id. at 10. 
 81 Id. at 2. One company offers an unlimited long-distance calling plan for $52.99 a month. 
Id. 
 82 See Letter from Anthony J. Annucci, Acting Comm’r, State of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. and 
Cmty. Supervision, to Gregory V. Haledjian, Attorney-Advisor, Pricing Policy Div.—Wireless 
Competition Bureau, Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n 1, 2 (July 8, 2013), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/75
20931060.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST4N-JJ8T] [hereinafter Annucci Letter] (noting that when com-
missions were banned in New York and prison phone call prices decreased, inmate phone calls 
increased). 
 83 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 11 (opining that charging for video visits is a 
regressive tax similar to the correctional telephone market). 
 84 See, e.g., Christopher Danzig, Video Arraignments Save Money and Make Judges Feel 
Safer, ABOVE THE LAW (June 27, 2011), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/06/video-arraignments-
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definitive database exists, tallies estimate that more than six hundred jails and 
prisons currently offer video visitation to inmates and their loved ones.85 
These services allow an inmate to see visitors via video broadcast over the 
Internet instead of in-person.86 At first blush, this appears to be a promising 
alternative that provides inmates a method of instant, face-to-face communi-
cation with visitors who are spared what can be a lengthy and costly trip to 
the facility.87 A large swath of inmates receive no in-person visits and many 
are housed far from their homes and families; this service could provide them 
with a means of communication more intimate than a phone call.88 In prac-
tice, however, video visitation is most often employed in jails, where inmates 
are typically closer to their loved ones than are inmates in prisons.89 Addi-
tionally, the services have severe limitations, can be even more expensive 
than phone calls, and often completely replace in-person visitation.90 
A private correctional operations company called VUGate was the first, 
in 1995, to institute a video visitation system at a correctional facility.91 Since 
                                                                                                                           
save-money-and-make-judges-feel-safer/ [https://perma.cc/D3P7-B4K9] (noting that state courts 
have used video conferencing for arraignments, witness testimony, and sentencing hearings); 
Sims, supra note 1 (noting the rise of video visitation in American correctional facilities). 
 85 See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 93 (noting that it is unclear how many correctional institu-
tions are using this technology); Law, supra note 75 (reporting that six hundred fifty correctional 
facilities offered video visitation in 2017). In 2016, researchers found that fifteen state prison systems 
were currently using the technology in some capacity, nine were in the process of implementing it, 
seven intended to implement it, and fourteen did not plan to implement it. LÉON DIGARD ET AL., 
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A NEW ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY?: IMPLEMENTING VIDEO VISITATION IN 
PRISON 6 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/video-visitation-in-prison.pdf [https://
perma.cc/27SM-423G]. In states that allow video visitation, a majority restrict access to the service 
for inmates who are housed in segregated units, such as solitary confinement. Id. 
 86 Fulcher, supra note 29, at 92. 
 87 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 2 (noting the potentially positive aspects of video 
visitation for inmates and their families). 
 88 Fulcher, supra note 29, at 100, 102; see Bales & Mears, supra note 61, at 304 (document-
ing that fifty-eight percent of inmates in a study were not visited during the year prior to their 
release). There are several obstacles to visitation, including distance, access to public or private 
transportation, and age or health. DIGARD ET AL., supra note 85, at 10. 
 89 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 4−5 (reporting that video visitation is most often 
used in jails and that inmates held in prisons are often farther from home than those in jails). 
 90 See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIDEO VISITING IN CORRECTIONS: BENE-
FITS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 16 (2014), https://s3.amazonaws.
com/static.nicic.gov/Library/029609.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMQ3-HR5C] (noting the limitations 
of video visitation, including, but not limited to, family dissatisfaction at the poor quality and 
camera angles, and illiteracy posing a potential barrier to setting up a video visitation account, and 
unaffordable fees); RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 10−11 (quoting a local county representa-
tive and reporting that one dollar per minute is a fair price to pay for video visitation and noting 
that most county jails ban in-person visitation after instituting video visitation). In 2012, for ex-
ample, the jail administrators in Washington D.C. completely replaced in-person visitation with 
video visitation. Fulcher, supra note 29, at 94. 
 91 Video Visitation, VUGATE, http://vugate.com/videovisitation.html [https://perma.cc/QSR3-
23MT]. VUGate notes on its website that it developed the technology using the input from prison 
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then other companies have entered the market, including Securus and Global 
Tel*Link, which also operate phone lines in facilities and bundle video visita-
tion with existing phone service contracts.92 This market is lucrative for such 
companies; Securus gave one county a $100,000 signing bonus for agreeing 
to a video visitation contract and it installed a $133,415 system in another 
county for free.93 Video visits, like phone calls, provide correctional facilities 
a source of income because the companies pay the facilities a commission 
from revenue derived from the visits.94 Video visitation companies and cor-
rectional facilities are thus incentivized to eliminate free in-person visitation 
to increase video visitation revenue.95 Indeed, until 2015, when it changed the 
language in its contracts, Securus required that correctional facilities imple-
menting its video visitation service eliminate in-person visitation.96 Both Se-
curus and Telmate, another video visitation provider, have admitted that ban-
ning in-person visitation is the only manner by which the companies can re-
cuperate the costs of installing and operating the systems.97 
                                                                                                                           
administrators, not the end users of the product, the inmates and their families. See id. (“Designed 
by Corrections Officers for Corrections officers”). 
 92 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 4 (finding that correctional phone companies have 
begun bundling video visitation services with phone services); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 93, 97 
(explaining how Securus and Global Tel*Link entered the video visitation market). Securus con-
trols approximately one-third of the video visitation market. Law, supra note 75. 
 93 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 12 (reporting how Securus installed a video visitation 
system for free in one county); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 97 (describing Securus’s signing bonus 
with another county). Another company, Jpay, paid the costs to install the video visitation system 
in Washington state prisons. DIGARD ET AL., supra note 85, at 11. 
 94 See KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (noting that correctional phone companies 
often pay commissions to correctional facilities); RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 13 (describ-
ing how commissions work in the video visitation industry); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 98–99 
(describing how video visitation systems generate revenue for correctional facilities). With video 
visitation, there is the potential for companies to derive money from advertisements that show on 
the screens. Fulcher, supra note 29, at 99. Some companies use the commissions to pay for initia-
tives that benefit inmates. See, e.g., DIGARD ET AL., supra note 85, at 12 (noting that revenue from 
video visitation in Washington state goes to the “Offender Betterment Fund,” which is used, 
among other things, for prison libraries and televisions). 
 95 See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 98−99 (noting that video visitation companies and correc-
tional facilities benefit financially from the use of video visitation). 
 96 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 20−21 (noting that a Securus contract included the 
language: “Customer will eliminate all face to face visitation through glass or otherwise at the 
Facility and will utilize video visitation for all non-professional on-site visitors”); Bernadette 
Rabuy, Securus Ends Its Ban on In-Person Visits, Shifts Responsibility to Sheriffs, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (May 6, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/05/06/securus-ends-ban/ [https://
perma.cc/R5YW-KEWD] (describing Securus’s change in contractual language to no longer re-
quire facilities to eliminate in-person visitation). 
 97 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 24−25. But Turnkey, another video visitation compa-
ny, found that retaining in-person visitation resulted in more video visitation usage than when in-
person visitation was eliminated. Id. at 25. 
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In contrast to free in-person visits, video visits can range from $5 to $12 
for a twenty minute conversation, and up to $40 for forty minutes.98 Often 
facilities also provide free video visits, but impose restrictions on them.99 
Washington County, Idaho, for example, offers inmates two free video visits 
per week, but they must occur between the hours of six and eight in the morn-
ing.100 Unsurprisingly, inmates use video visitation services more frequently 
when the cost decreases.101 
A typical video visitation set-up includes two kiosks, one outside and 
one inside the facility, where the inmate and visitor sit facing a screen dis-
playing the other’s face.102 One mother drove an hour and a half to the jail 
where her son was held to visit him not in person, but via video.103 Some 
companies place the visitor’s kiosk at the facility itself, while others place 
them in the community.104 Some also allow for video visitation via mobile 
device.105 The visits are recorded, and correctional staff can either review a 
visit later or observe it in real time and terminate it in the event of inappropri-
ate behavior.106 
Video visits are plagued by technological problems, making it more dif-
ficult for inmates and loved ones to share meaningful interactions.107 In the 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. at 10 (noting that in-person visitation is traditionally free); Law, supra note 75 (report-
ing the price range for video visits). In 2016, five state prison systems offered video visitation at 
no cost to inmates or their families. DIGARD ET AL., supra note 85, at 13. 
 99 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that many facilities provide at least 
some free video visits, but often with cumbersome restrictions). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 27 (illustrating that as price-per-minute of a video visit decreased in Travis 
County, Texas jails, the average minutes used per inmate per month increased). 
 102 Fulcher, supra note 29, at 92. 
 103 Law, supra note 75. This mother had the option of visiting from home via her mobile 
device, at the price of almost seven dollars for a twenty-minute visit. Id. 
 104 See LÉON DIGARD ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CLOSING THE DISTANCE: THE IMPACT OF 
VIDEO VISITS IN WASHINGTON STATE 5 (2017) [hereinafter DIGARD ET AL., CLOSING THE DISTANCE], 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/closing-the-distance/legacy_
downloads/The-Impact-of-Video-Visits-on-Washington-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QRF-
E9H8] (describing how in Washington State, inmates’ family members may call from portals in 
the community); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 92 (noting that some inmates may use kiosks in their 
facilities). 
 105 Sims, supra note 1. 
 106 See DIGARD ET AL., CLOSING THE DISTANCE, supra note 104, at 8 (describing how in 
Washington State, correctional officials may supervise video visits in real time or watch them 
later). 
 107 See, e.g., Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (noting the 
“poor audio quality” for video visits at a prison and commenting that the similarly poor quality of 
the video feed caused “some mentally ill inmates to believe that the images on the video screens 
are manipulated and to refuse visitors”); Jack Smith IV, ‘Video Visitation’ Is Ending In-Person 
Prison Visits—and Prisons Are Going to Make a Ton of Money, BUS. INSIDER: MIC (May 5, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/video-visitation-is-ending-in-person-prison-visits-2016-5 
[https://perma.cc/8DUG-ZH2E] (documenting the travails of a woman who attempted to video 
visit with an inmate using two computers to no avail so she switched to her phone, but saw what 
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Clark County, Nevada jail, for example, over half of the video visits each 
month were cancelled due to system glitches.108 Because companies consider 
their customers to be correctional officials, not the inmates and their families, 
they have no financial incentive to improve the design and efficiency of the 
systems.109 In fact, it may be in the companies’ financial interest to provide a 
malfunctioning service because when a video visit is interrupted or lost the 
user may pay for another visit.110 Additionally, families that use the system 
note its lack of privacy and the potential for callers’ increased exposure to 
inmate violence.111 Furthermore, because the camera is located above the 
screen, video visits prevent families from maintaining eye contact, which is 
important for interpersonal communication.112 Video visits, in sum, have in-
herent disadvantages for the people who use them, are prone to technological 
issues, and are more expensive as well as substantially less personal than in-
person visits.113 
                                                                                                                           
appeared like a “tangle of blinds” on the screen instead of her loved one’s face, and was subse-
quently charged $10 for the visit, despite ending it several minutes early). 
 108 Annalise Little, Home Video Chats, Other Upgrades Coming to CCDC, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/home-video-chats-other-
upgrades-coming-to-ccdc/ [https://perma.cc/WL9R-N8ZJ]. In Louisiana, one woman paid $12.99 
for a call on which her incarcerated boyfriend could not hear her. Sims, supra note 1. The boy-
friend noted that the system did not work for either of the two other inmates he knew of who had 
tried it. Id. 
 109 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 3, 7 (noting that video visitation industry leaders 
consider jails and prisons their customers, and have not responded to “consistent complaints” 
about technological glitches and issues with the systems). 
 110 See KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 13 (noting that, in the context of inmate tele-
phone calls, companies have been accused of dropping calls to increase revenue); Little, supra 
note 108 (noting that half of the video visits per month at a facility were canceled because of tech-
nological problems). In Florida, for example, inmate phone companies refused to cooperate in an 
investigation into alleged improper dropping of inmates’ phone calls, and, facing $6 million in 
demanded refunds, settled for $1.25 million. KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 13. 
 111 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that facility tension can increase due 
to the lack of visitation privacy); Peter Hermann, Visiting a Detainee in the D.C. Jail Now Done 
by Video, WASH. POST (July 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/visiting-a-
detainee-in-the-dc-jail-now-done-by-video/2012/07/28/gJQAcf1TGX_story.html?utm_term=.480
b0e8c3572 [https://perma.cc/37L5-PYQF] (quoting a woman who, during a visit with her incar-
cerated boyfriend, to which she brought their daughter, saw a fight break out in the background, 
ending her visit, which she already derided as lacking privacy). 
 112 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that video visitation set ups create in-
terpersonal communication that is different from in-person communication, and that families 
complain about the “impersonal” feeling from the dearth of eye contact); H. Müge Satar, Multi-
modal Language Learner Interactions Via Desktop Videoconferencing Within a Framework of 
Social Presence: Gaze, 25 RECALL 122, 123 (2013) (noting that video conferencing in general 
does not provide the same level of eye-contact, important to human communication, that occurs in 
person). 
 113 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 8, 10 (noting impersonal aspects of video visita-
tion and the technological issues); Law, supra note 75 (describing the high price range of video 
visitation). 
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II. INMATES’ RIGHTS IN FRONT OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND  
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY APPROACHES TO VIDEO VISITATION 
Section A of this Part details the history of inmate challenges to correc-
tional policies on constitutional grounds.114 Section B illustrates how various 
legislatures have handled video visitation.115 Section C concludes by describ-
ing challenges and successes in regulating video visitation.116 
A. The History of Constitutional Challenges to Correctional  
Policies Before the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of video visitation, but 
in recent decisions has often held that correctional policies restricting in-
mates’ rights are constitutional.117 Once an individual has been lawfully in-
carcerated, many of that person’s rights and privileges are curtailed.118 Begin-
ning at least in the 1930s, federal courts took a hands-off approach to many 
inmates’ constitutional challenges to conditions of incarceration because of 
federalism concerns.119 During the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the fed-
eral judiciary brought the rights of the Constitution to bear on the experiences 
of inmates.120 Some district courts went so far as to take control of entire state 
prison systems.121 The crackdown was brief, and in the late 1970s the Su-
preme Court issued a series of decisions limiting the role that federal courts 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 117−153 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 154−165 and accompanying text. 
 116 See infra notes 166−190 and accompanying text. 
 117 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131, 132 (2003) (sustaining a prison regula-
tion prohibiting contact visits). This Note does not specifically address the Eighth Amendment, 
which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, because social isolation is not typically considered 
to violate it. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Gertrude Strassburger, Comment, Judicial Inaction and 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Are Super-Maximum Walls Too High for the Eighth Amend-
ment?, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 199, 206 (2001). In the most recent challenge to visita-
tion restrictions, inmates asserted First Amendment freedom of association, Eighth Amendment 
cruel and unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims. Over-
ton, 539 U.S. at 128, 131, 136. 
 118 Overton, 539 U.S. at 131 (noting that a host of liberties enjoyed by free individuals “must 
be surrendered by the prisoner” once incarcerated); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) 
(commenting that incarceration leads to “the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileg-
es and rights” because of penal considerations). 
 119 James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the Turnerization of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 99 (2006). 
 120 Id. at 100. 
 121 See id. at 100−01 (noting that courts did this through “all-encompassing structural injunc-
tions”). 
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play in assessing inmates’ constitutional claims, instructing courts to provide 
nearly unbridled deference to the decisions of correctional officials.122 
The trend toward deferring to correctional officials began in 1974 when 
the Court noted in Procunier v. Martinez that there are “Herculean obstacles” 
to effective correctional management and that federal courts are “ill equipped” 
to deal with them.123 When presented with a constitutional challenge to a cor-
rectional policy, courts should defer to correctional officials decisionmak-
ing.124 The Court in Martinez declared a two-part standard courts should ap-
ply when deciding whether to uphold a rights-restrictive policy.125 It must 
both advance a substantial correctional interest and be specifically tailored to 
protect that interest.126 The decisions following Martinez narrowed this stand-
ard and allowed for increasingly restrictive correctional policies to withstand 
judicial scrutiny.127 
In Pell v. Procunier, decided in the same term as Martinez, the Court 
concluded that inmate freedom of speech claims must be analyzed in the con-
text of the correctional system’s objectives; inmates retain only First Amend-
ment rights that do not conflict with them.128 The Court cited the objective of 
internal prison security in upholding correctional officials’ decision to block 
certain media visitors from seeing inmates.129 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. at 101−02; see Simeon Goldstein, Note, Prisoners with AIDS: Constitutional and 
Statutory Rights Implicated in Family Visitation Programs, 31 B.C. L. REV. 967, 969 (1990) 
(commenting that courts give deference to prison administrators). 
 123 416 U.S. 396, 404−05 (1974). 
 124 Id. (commenting that correctional management is within the domain of the executive and 
legislative, and that where state prison systems are involved, there is an added reason to defer to 
correctional authorities). But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555−56 (1974) (noting that 
“there is no iron curtain” between prisons and the Constitution). 
 125 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406, 413. For the first time the Court addressed how inmates’ First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights should be balanced against a correctional policy restricting 
those rights. Id. at 406. 
 126 Id. at 413. The Court was reacting to a variety of approaches to such questions in the lower 
courts. Id. at 406−07. Applying the new standard, the Court found that California’s regulations 
allowing for the censoring of inmates’ mail for content that was inflammatory or overstated griev-
ances was unconstitutional because prison officials could censor mail that was simply critical, and 
that no government interest was advanced besides suppression of expression. Id. at 415. 
 127 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413−14 (1989) (limiting the applicability of 
the Martinez test to situations involving outgoing inmate correspondence). 
 128 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The Court listed the following among goals of 
the penal system: deterrence, because prison is an undesirable place; societal protection, because 
inmates cannot harm society from within prison; and rehabilitation, because most inmates will 
return to society and hopefully not recidivate. Id. at 822−23. 
 129 Id. at 826, 827−28. The Court also found that alternative means of communication re-
mained open to the inmates and the media. Id. at 823−24. The Court noted that, following its hold-
ing in Martinez, prisoners would be especially free and able to communicate with the media by 
mail. Id. at 824. Also, because prisoners are allowed to visit with family, friends, the clergy, and 
attorneys, they could use these visitors as intermediaries to communicate with the media. Id. at 
824−25. 
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The Court then held in Meachum v. Fano that inmates are not entitled to 
hearings when correctional officials adversely alter the conditions of their 
confinement.130 Invoking deference to correctional officials’ decisions, the 
Court refused to hold that “any substantial deprivation” of a right requires the 
protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
Next, in Jones v. North Carolina, the Court acknowledged that correc-
tional officials have the latitude to institute a proactive policy mitigating a 
threat that they cannot show exists.132 Because officials are accorded defer-
ence in their decisions regarding facility policy, the Court concluded that 
those challenging such a policy bear the burden of showing that it is unrea-
sonable.133 Once a correctional official decides that a certain activity could 
negatively affect facility security, a policy may stand so long as the officials’ 
decision is not “conclusively shown to be wrong.”134 
In Block v. Rutherford, the Court directly addressed inmate visitation, 
considering whether inmates have any constitutional right to contact visits 
with family and friends.135 Deferring to the judgment of correctional officials, 
the Court concluded that the correctional interests of keeping contraband out 
of facilities and keeping visitors safe from hostage or escape predicaments 
justified a policy banning contact visitation.136 Having found some justifica-
tion supporting the policy, the Court ended the constitutional inquiry.137 
                                                                                                                           
 130 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 (1983) (noting that 
the Constitution permitted transferring an inmate from Hawaii to the mainland, where he was 
separated from his loved ones). In Meachum several Massachusetts inmates challenged prison 
officials’ decisions to send them to different prisons, where the living conditions were worse than 
their previous placements. 427 U.S. at 218. 
 131 Meachum, 427 U.S at 225. The Court noted that a prisoner’s expectation of remaining at a 
prison is not substantial enough to require due process protections. Id. at 228. Prison officials may 
be free from due process constraints to move prisoners for “whatever reason or for no reason at 
all.” Id.  
 132 433 U.S. 119, 132−33 (1977). 
 133 Id. at 127−28. This deference arises out of the complicated realities of running a peniten-
tiary. Id. at 126. 
 134 Id. at 132. State prison officials testified that an inmate union was “fraught with potential 
dangers.” Id. at 126. The Court concluded that, given the potential threat the union organizing 
presented to internal prison order, the regulation banning them survived First and Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges. Id. at 133, 136. 
 135 468 U.S. 576, 577, 578 (1984). Several pretrial detainees challenged the Los Angeles 
County Jail policy of prohibiting inmates from contract visits. Id. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court held 
that correctional facility policies that are reasonably related to penal objectives are not punish-
ment, and so may be applied to pretrial detainees. 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). 
 136 Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 586−87. The Court provided no factual support for the contention 
that those who visit inmates may “be taken as hostages or become innocent pawns in escape at-
tempts.” See id. at 587 (providing no citation to factual evidence). 
 137 Id. at 589. 
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In Turner v. Safley, the Court established the modern test applied to in-
mates’ constitutional challenges to correctional policies.138 It held that a poli-
cy affecting inmates’ constitutional rights is valid if it is “reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.”139 The Court described four factors that 
should guide this assessment.140 First, there must be a rational nexus between 
the policy and the “legitimate governmental interest” advanced to justify it.141 
Second, courts should consider whether there are alternative means of express-
ing the restricted right.142 Third, the impact of any accommodation on guards, 
other inmates, and prison resources should be accounted for.143 Fourth, courts 
should consider whether there are ready alternatives to the challenged regula-
tion.144 
Shortly thereafter, in Thornburgh v. Abbott, the Court explicitly nar-
rowed the Martinez standard, nearly overruling it outright.145 It noted its trend 
towards creating a standard of constitutional review that defers to correctional 
officials when assessing policies concerned with the preservation of order and 
security within a facility.146 Bowing to officials’ invocation of the broad in-
terest in facility security, the Court commented that a policy could be rational 
if it bans something that, although not “likely” to cause violence, an official 
determines creates an unacceptable risk of “disorder.”147 
                                                                                                                           
 138 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner test, however, is not applicable to every inmate’s con-
stitutional claim. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005). Only rights that are “incon-
sistent with proper incarceration,” or those that must be compromised for correctional administra-
tion, like freedom of association and access to courts, are governed by the Turner test. Id. (quoting 
Overton, 539 U.S. at 131). Claims of racial discrimination made under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, on the other hand, are not governed by the Turner test because such discrimination hinders 
the “legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.” Id. at 510−11. 
 139 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The court rejected a stricter level of scrutiny because operating a 
correctional institution is a difficult task. Id. The court noted that separation of power principles 
caution against the judiciary inserting itself into the day-to-day decisions of correctional officials. 
Id. at 85. 
 140 Id. at 89−91. 
 141 Id. at 89 (quoting Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 586). 
 142 Id. at 90. 
 143 Id. The Court acknowledged that prisons are closed systems, and so any accommodation 
would impact others within the system. Id. 
 144 Id. The court expressly rejected a “least restrictive” test, so that prison officials do not 
have to show that they have attempted to accommodate inmates’ rights. Id. at 90−91. Prisoners 
may, however, suggest alternatives that can aid a court in determining whether the regulation is 
valid if the alternatives do not impose significant cost. Id. at 91. 
 145 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413−14 (1989). With regard to First Amendment 
claims concerning mail coming into prisons, the Court adopted the reasonableness standard articu-
lated in Turner. Id. at 414. The Court held that the Martinez standard only applies to correctional 
regulations governing outgoing mail. Id. at 413. Outgoing mail, according to the Court, poses a 
lesser security risk than material coming into a prison because it can then be disseminated among 
prisoners, potentially wreaking havoc. Id. at 412. 
 146 Id. at 409−10. 
 147 Id. at 415, 417. 
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More recently, in Overton v. Bazzetta, the Court again directly confront-
ed a challenge to a visitation policy.148 Correctional officials in Michigan es-
tablished regulations limiting the number and type of visitors an inmate could 
receive, claiming that visitors posed the threat of smuggling drugs into pris-
on.149 Sounding a familiar refrain, the Court noted that the judgment of cor-
rectional officials, who both define legitimate penal goals and determine the 
appropriate means to achieve them, must be given “substantial deference.”150 
Finding that the restrictive visitation regulations were rationally related to the 
penal interest of security and deterring drug use and thus passed constitution-
al muster, the Court skirted broader consideration of the limits that incarcera-
tion places on inmates’ “right to intimate association” with those outside of 
the facility.151 
Clearly, the Supreme Court gives great weight to correctional officials’ 
decisions when considering inmates’ constitutional claims challenging correc-
tional policies and regulations.152 Furthermore, the Court places the burden 
on inmates to show that a policy is unreasonable, and does not require evi-
dence to support the reasoning behind a challenged policy.153 
B. Legislative Involvement with Video Visitation 
Congress and state legislatures have not provided many protections for 
inmates; what protections exist have come from the courts.154 Inaction is like-
ly due, at least in part, to the fact that many citizens who are convicted of fel-
onies are disenfranchised both while they are incarcerated and following their 
                                                                                                                           
 148 539 U.S. 126, 128 (2003). 
 149 Id. at 129. The regulations required that inmates maintain a visitor list, and stated that they 
could only visit with those approved and on the list. Id. The list could include an unlimited num-
ber of family members and up to ten non-family members. Id. Only children with a direct relation 
to inmates could be placed on the list, unless parental rights were terminated. Id. at 129−30. In-
mates who committed multiple substance-abuse infractions were not permitted any visitors for at 
least two years. Id. at 130. 
 150 Id. at 132. 
 151 Id. at 131−32, 133, 134. 
 152 See, e.g., id. at 132 (noting that correctional officials are owed deference in setting policy 
and regulations); see also Shay, supra note 44, at 339 (commenting that Supreme Court precedent 
treats corrections regulations “as an undifferentiated monolith” with no regard for how they are 
created). 
 153 See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417 (concluding that it is rational for a regulation to ban 
something unlikely to cause violence); Jones, 433 U.S. at 127−28, 132−33 (holding that the bur-
den of demonstrating a regulation is unreasonable falls upon the inmate, and noting that a prison 
regulation may respond to a threat that has not yet been shown to exist). 
 154 See James F. Smith, Prison Reform Through the Legislature, in THE POLITICS OF PUN-
ISHMENT 262, 262 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 1973) (noting that almost all accused criminals have 
come through the courts). But see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.8031 (West 2010) (concluding that 
maintaining inmates’ ties to the community through increasing the “frequency and quality of the 
visits” is an “underutilized correctional resource”). 
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release.155 Deprived of their voting rights, they have no political “bargaining 
chip” with which to affect the legislative agenda.156 Inaction also occurs be-
cause a state’s primary correctional policymaker, the head of its department of 
corrections, is tasked with setting prison visitation policy, while a state’s sher-
iffs may set county jail visitation policy.157 The leaders of individual facilities 
also have considerable latitude in setting facility-specific policies.158 
Recently, however, Congress and state legislatures have intervened in 
correctional visitation policy, requiring facilities to maintain in-person visita-
tion schemes even if they implement video visitation.159 In 2017, as part of a 
budget deal, California passed a law prohibiting correctional facilities that 
offered in-person visitation from converting to video-only visitation.160 The 
law additionally requires facilities offering on-site video visitation to provide 
the service for free.161 The Texas legislature also passed a law requiring jails 
to provide in-person visitation, although it does not require facilities that al-
ready switched to video-only visitation to return to in-person visitation.162 
Massachusetts recently passed a law requiring that correctional facilities pro-
vide in-person visitation, and that those electing to incorporate video visita-
tion also offer in-person visitation.163 In Congress, a representative proposed 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment allows felons to be disenfranchised even after they have completed 
their sentence and parole); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 459 (1999) (listing inmates among insular minorities, and noting the fact 
that prisoners are often disenfranchised). 
 156 Chemerinsky, supra note 155, at 460. 
 157 See Boudin et al., supra note 43, at 159−60 (noting that statewide prison visitation policy is 
set by the state’s department of corrections head); Walt Bogdanich & Grace Ashford, An Alabama 
Sheriff, a Mystery Check and a Blogger Who Cried Foul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/ana-franklin-alabama-sheriff.html [https://perma.cc/KY54-9PYG] (not-
ing that county Sheriffs often have “unfettered dominion” over jail policy). 
 158 See Boudin et al., supra note 43, at 159 (finding that the directors of individual facilities 
often retain “some” discretion over visitation policy). 
 159 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4032(b) (West Supp. 2019) (prohibiting “local detention 
centers” from adopting video visitation in lieu of in-person visitation if they offered in-person 
visitation as of January 1, 2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(20) (West Supp. 2018) 
(requiring county jails to offer a minimum of two in-person visits per week); Video Visitation in 
Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 6441, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (prohibiting video visitation from replac-
ing in-person visitation in federal facilities); H.R. Paper 572, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 
2019) (requiring sheriffs to provide for in-person visitation at county jails, unless a determination 
is made that a particular inmate requires video visits for security reasons). 
 160 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4032(b); Jazmin Ulloa, California Jails Won’t Be Able to Restrict Face-
to-Face Family Visits for Inmates Under State Budget Deal, L.A. TIMES: ESSENTIAL POLITICS (June 
15, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-california-
jails-will-have-to-provide-1497578912-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/N4HT-XXVS]. 
 161 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4032(d). 
 162 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(20), (a-1) (requiring that the corrections committee 
provide “each prisoner at a county jail with a minimum of two in-person, noncontact visitation 
periods per week,” but allowing noncompliance by certain facilities built before September 2015). 
 163 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 127, § 36C (West Supp. 2019). 
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the Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, which would allow the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate video visitation and require 
that federal prisons not replace in-person visitation with video services.164 
Although correctional policies are not typically the province of the legisla-
ture, it is not impossible that legislators will act to address the replacement of 
in-person visitation with video visitation.165 
C. Regulatory Agency Involvement with Video Visitation 
Regulatory agencies at both the federal and state level have attempted, 
with little success, to address the exorbitant prices of prison phone calls.166 
These fruitless efforts could set the mold for similar attempts to regulate the 
video visitation industry.167 
In 2000, a group known as the Wright Plaintiffs sued various private 
correctional and correctional phone companies alleging violations of antitrust 
laws.168 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, finding that reg-
ulatory, not judicial, intervention was warranted, stayed the matter so the FCC 
could act.169 In 2015, the FCC set rate and fee caps for inmate phone calls and 
                                                                                                                           
 164 H.R. 6441. The bill did not pass during the 2016 session of Congress. Peter Rugg, Prisons 
Are Replacing In-Person Visits with Video Visitation—and Putting Families in Debt, THE DAILY 
DOT: LAYER 8 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/video-visitation-prison-problems/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2LZ-G9XJ]. 
 165 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4032(b) (requiring correctional facilities to continue offer-
ing in-person visitation if they had not yet switched to video-only by January 1, 2017); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 511.009(a)(20) (requiring county jails to offer a minimum of two in-person 
visits per week); see also Boudin et al., supra note 43, at 159 (finding that state DOCs often de-
termine correctional policies). 
 166 See Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(finding that the Federal Communications Commission did not have the regulatory authority to 
regulate the state prison phone industry); Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 968 A.2d 1047, 
1048−49 (Me. 2009) (holding that the Maine Public Utilities Commission lacked the statutory 
authority to regulate the state’s prison telephone scheme); see also Bowers v. T-Netix, 837 A.2d 
608, 610, 613, 614 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (concluding that, among other things, a pro se state 
prison inmate, who alleged that the state prison’s exclusive phone contract with a private company 
violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law because he was unable to use a third party to call, the company failed to 
reimburse him for dropped calls, and he was charged long-distance rates for local calls, failed to 
state a claim under federal law and lacked standing under state law). 
 167 See Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 402 (finding that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion did not have the regulatory authority to regulate the state prison phone industry); Dep’t of 
Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 968 A.2d at 1048−49 (holding that the Maine Public Utilities Com-
mission lacked the statutory authority to regulate the state’s prison telephone scheme). 
 168 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 404; see KUKOROWSKI ET AL., supra note 13, at 3 (describ-
ing the “Wright Plaintiffs” and the eponymous original plaintiff Martha Wright). 
 169 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 404. The Communications Act of 1934 provides the FCC 
with authority to regulate interstate phone rates, leaving intrastate rate regulation to the states. Id. 
at 401. Attempting to curb local phone company monopolies, Congress amended the Communica-
tions Act in 1996, providing the FCC with more authority over intrastate calls. Id. The amended 
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issued regulations for video visitation services.170 Various correctional phone 
companies challenged the order in district court.171 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia concluded that the FCC, which abandoned de-
fending aspects of the order following a political change in power at the 
agency, had exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to regulate intra-
state inmate phone call rates, and vacated that part of the order.172 Judge Pil-
lard, dissenting in part, noted that the FCC’s mandate to ensure phone com-
panies be fairly compensated does not prevent it from reducing unfairly high 
calling rates.173 Because over eighty percent of phone calls from inmates oc-
cur intrastate, the court’s ruling prevents the FCC’s regulatory power from 
reaching the vast majority of prison phone calls.174 The court also concluded 
that the FCC could not require correctional companies to file reports on the 
use of video visitation services because the matter was too attenuated to the 
FCC’s authority.175 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in what could be used as persuasive 
authority by other state courts, has considered a similar issue.176 The court 
vacated a finding by the state’s Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) 
that it had jurisdiction over the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to regu-
                                                                                                                           
Act requires that payphone providers be “fairly compensated for each and every” inter- and intra-
state call. 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A) (2012); Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 401. 
 170 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 401. 
 171 Id. at 405. The rate caps issued in 2015 initially restricted per-minute calling rates to be-
tween $0.14 to $0.49, which were set to decrease to between $0.11 to $0.22 in 2018. Id. The regu-
lation also attempted to address ancillary fee schemes and regulate video visitation services. Id. at 
401. The FCC does not generally have authority over intrastate communication services, although 
it has the limited authority to ensure that phone service providers are “fairly compensated” for 
intrastate phone calls. 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). The FCC has broader power, under 47 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b), to enact regulations to ensure that interstate calling rates are “just and reasonable.” 
Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 409. The FCC, confusingly, conflated the two standards in its regula-
tion, calling for a rate standard that was “just, reasonable and fair.” Id. 
 172 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 402. The FCC initially defended the regulation in court. See 
id. (noting that counsel for the FCC advised the court that it would no longer defend certain as-
pects of its order). Because the FCC did not rescind the regulation, however, the court found that 
the issue was not moot. Id. at 407. The new commissioner of the FCC, Ajit Pai, had previously 
represented Securus, a titan in the prison phone industry, while working as a partner at Jenner & 
Block. Law, supra note 75. Despite this previous conflict of interest, Pai was cleared by the FCC’s 
ethics office to continue to work on the matter. Id. 
 173 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 420, 421 (Pillard, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). Judge Pillard, dissenting in part, noted that the record was replete with “compelling evi-
dence of dysfunction in the inmate-calling marketplace, with harsh consequences” for the users. 
Id. at 419. 
 174 See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Service, Second Report and Order and Third Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd. 12,763, 12,768 (2015) (noting that over eighty 
percent of correctional facility calls are intrastate). 
 175 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 415. The court found that the FCC must explain how its 
statutory authority includes video visitation before it may regulate such services. Id. 
 176 See Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 968 A.2d at 1048−49 (finding that the state 
Public Utilities Commission cannot regulate the state Department of Corrections calling scheme). 
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late the DOC’s phone system.177 Framing the issue as one of statutory inter-
pretation, the court considered the interaction between the Commission, 
which has “broad authority” over telephones in Maine, and the DOC, which 
has “broad authority” over inmates.178 Because Maine case law supports the 
contention that the DOC is not controlled by another state agency without 
express statutory authority and no statute gave the Commission such authori-
ty, it could not regulate the DOC.179 Relinquishing control over prison opera-
tions would interfere with the DOC’s ability to ensure a secure and stable 
prison environment.180 The court buffered its holding by noting that the 
DOC’s mandate from the legislature to have expansive authority over prison 
policy did not suggest that the DOC could not regulate prison phone ser-
vices.181 
Yet where communications regulators have fallen short, correctional of-
ficials have succeeded.182 Because correctional officials have broad and often 
unchecked authority in setting policy, they have been able to address the cor-
rectional phone industry.183 In 2007, for example, the New York State De-
partment of Corrections and Community Supervision, facing criticism from 
inmate advocacy groups and a class action lawsuit challenging its phone call 
commission scheme, worked closely with the state legislature to prohibit it-
self from receiving any commission on inmate phone calls.184 The results 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id. at 1049. Loved ones of prisoners filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commis-
sion claiming that the rates charged for prison phone calls were unreasonable and unjustly dis-
criminatory. Id. 
 178 Id. at 1050. 
 179 Id. at 1051. The statute authorizing the Commission to regulate “telephone utilities” pro-
vides it authority over a “legal entity.” Id. at 1050. Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, the Com-
mission concluded that the DOC fell within that definition. Id. The DOC argued, however, that the 
Commission required express statutory authority in order to regulate it. Id. The court agreed with 
the DOC, finding it unreasonable to rely on Black’s Law Dictionary instead of settled Maine case 
law, which found that the State was not included in statutory definitions of “person,” but had not 
yet considered whether the State was a “legal entity.” Id. at 1051. 
 180 Id. at 1052. 
 181 Id. at 1051−52. The court noted that maintaining control over the telecommunications 
within the prison was “essential” to facility security. Id. at 1052. 
 182 See, e.g., Annucci Letter, supra note 82, at 1 (noting that the New York State Department 
of Corrections and Community Supervision removed commissions on inmate telephone calls). 
 183 See Shay, supra note 44, at 333 (noting that courts defer to correctional officials’ deci-
sions, and that these decisions can take the form of official regulations or unofficial memoranda); 
Annucci Letter, supra note 82, at 1 (describing how the New York State Department of Correc-
tions and Community Supervision eliminated commissions on inmate telephone calls). Prison 
regulations range from state-wide rules that are subject to a public comment period, to “informal 
memoranda” written by sheriffs. Shay, supra note 44, at 333. 
 184 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 623 (McKinney 2014) (requiring the “lowest possible cost to the 
telephone user” to be of central importance in entering into inmate telephone contracts); see An-
nucci Letter, supra note 82, at 1 (detailing the collaboration between the state legislature, the 
DOC, and inmate advocacy groups in writing the law). 
1268 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1243 
were dramatic: the average cost of a phone call decreased from over $4 to less 
than $1, and the number of annual phone calls increased by over 8 million.185 
Correctional officials can similarly act to curtail the replacement of in-
person visitation with video visitation.186 In Adams County, Mississippi, for 
example, a newly elected sheriff scrapped the video-only visitation scheme 
maintained by his predecessor and resumed offering in-person visitation.187 
The Illinois Department of Corrections plans to introduce video visitation as 
an option while maintaining in-person visitation.188 And in Maryland, video 
visitation is available only at prisons that cannot be accessed by public trans-
portation.189 Correctional officials have the power to decide what type of vis-
itation scheme is employed at their facilities, and they are crucial to maintain-
ing in-person visitation.190 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Annucci Letter, supra note 82, at 1−2. But correctional officials do not always take such a 
considerate tack; following the FCC’s attempts to regulate inmate phone calls, the executive direc-
tor of the National Sheriffs’ Association stated that sheriffs could eliminate inmate phone calls 
because they are not required to provide such services. Eric Markowitz, Why American Jails May 
Drastically Curtail Inmate Phone Calls, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 5, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.
com/why-american-jails-may-drastically-curtail-inmate-phone-calls-1904855 [https://perma.cc/
5NTG-KJW7]. Another sheriff sent a letter to the FCC echoing this sentiment, writing that “we 
may be forced to significantly limit or eliminate altogether access to inmate phones in our jail.” Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Paul Hampel, Video Visits at St. Clair County Jail Get Mixed Reviews, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/video-
visits-at-st-clair-county-jail-get-mixed-reviews/article_b46594b0-9f01-5987-abf0-83152f76c9dd.
html [https://perma.cc/8ZT9-ECVN] (reporting that the Illinois Department of Corrections plans 
to introduce video visitation, while maintaining in-person visitation as an option at its facilities); 
Vershal Hogan, Sheriff to Discontinue Video Visitation at Jail, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT (Apr. 22, 
2016), https://www.natchezdemocrat.com/2016/04/22/sheriff-to-discontinue-video-visitation-at-
jail/ [https://perma.cc/2M88-KH33] (documenting a sheriff who replaced video visitation with in-
person visitation at his facility). 
 187 Hogan, supra note 186. The sheriff stated, “[a] lot of people couldn’t afford those 
calls. . . . I think everybody should have the right to check in on their child (in jail) and make sure 
they’re OK.” Id. 
 188 Hampel, supra note 186. The Department of Corrections spokesperson stated, “I can’t 
imagine the scenario in which someone would travel to a prison and then wish to communicate 
through a video screen rather than see a prisoner face-to-face.” Id. 
 189 DIGARD ET AL., supra note 85, at 8. Pennsylvania only allows video visitation for prison-
ers who have not received an in-person visit for over a year. Id. 
 190 See Shay, supra note 44, at 333 (describing how correctional officials have broad authority 
over institutional regulations and policy); Jennifer Sullivan, King County to Install Video System 
in Jails for Virtual Inmate Visits, SEATTLE TIMES (June 18, 2014), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/king-county-to-install-video-system-in-jails-for-virtual-inmate-visits/ [https://perma.
cc/SWB8-PT84] (reporting that King County, Washington planned to install a video visitation 
system while still allowing for in-person visits, but quoting the interim jail director saying that in-
person visits may eventually be terminated). 
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III. WHY VIDEO VISITATION SHOULD NOT REPLACE IN-PERSON  
VISITATION, AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO EXISTING  
VIDEO VISITATION POLICIES 
Section A of this Part argues that in-person visitation should be pre-
served at correctional facilities.191 Section B then describes how a constitu-
tional challenge to a video visitation scheme that replaces in-person visitation 
might fare.192 Section C examines whether legislation could preserve in-
person visitation.193 Section D concludes by discussing whether a viable regu-
latory solution exists to maintain in-person visitation.194 
A. The Case for Maintaining In-Person Visitation 
Humans crave the ability to connect with others, and certain aspects of 
in-person interactions are crucial in satisfying this desire.195 Evolutionarily, 
humans developed an emphasis for the visual in social interactions.196 All of 
our other senses are integrated with our vision.197 So although spoken words 
may carry “instrumental” content, we make meaning of that content based on 
what we see.198 Video visitation severely limits this crucial element of human 
communication.199 Users complain of technological failures and poor quality, 
which prevent loved ones from seeing each other clearly.200 Also, as men-
tioned above, video visits prevent loved ones from making eye-contact, com-
promising a critical feature of the exchange.201 Additionally, when physically 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See infra notes 195−219 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra notes 220−243 and accompanying text. 
 193 See infra notes 244−248 and accompanying text. 
 194 See infra notes 249−255 and accompanying text. 
 195 See PINKER, supra note 52, at 62 (describing how reading emotions from someone’s face 
and building trust through touch are desired by humans). 
 196 JONATHAN H. TURNER, FACE TO FACE: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF INTER-
PERSONAL BEHAVIOR 50−51 (2002). When early primates began climbing trees millions of years 
ago, their most important sense shifted from smell to vision, so they could better see where they 
were stepping in the forest. Id. at 50. Humans have more exposed facial skin than other animals, 
which allows us to gauge the blood flow and small muscles in each other’s faces, enhancing our 
ability to center interactions around facial expressions. Id. at 64. We are also able to communicate 
our emotions through body language. Id. 
 197 Id. at 51. 
 198 Id. at 64. Auditory channels can also convey emotional messages, but visual channels do 
the heavy lifting. Id. When we communicate, we find it difficult to constrain our facial expressions 
and bodily movements, because they are the primary method of communicating emotion. Id. Thus, 
using subtle cues like signs and gestures play a critical role in emotional communication. Id. 
 199 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 7−9 (describing issues in video feeds with regard 
to prison video visitation); TURNER, supra note 196, at 65 (noting that seeing someone’s face is 
important for human communication). 
 200 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 7. 
 201 See id. at 8 (noting that video visitation portals are built with the camera several inches 
above the screen); Satar, supra note 112, at 123 (noting that video conferencing in general does 
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close to someone we are communicating with we are better able to empathize 
with that person and be more engaged in the conversation.202 Because prison 
visits occur within an institutionalized framework, they are already different 
than normal in-person contact with loved ones.203 
If the connectivity that inmates and their loved ones experience through 
in-person visitation is eliminated or dampened through video visitation, then 
the institutional security, recidivism benefits, and integrity of the penal sys-
tem could suffer.204 Research suggests that increased in-person visitation 
boosts facility security.205 In-person visitation has also been linked to a de-
crease in recidivism.206 Furthermore, correctional officials originally wel-
comed visitors because they could help monitor facilities.207 But eliminating 
in-person visitation prevents loved ones from effectually assessing an in-
mate’s physical condition and advocating for improvements, threatening the 
transparency and integrity of the penal system.208 
                                                                                                                           
not provide the same level of eye-contact, important to human communication, that occurs face-
to-face); see also Matthew 6:22 (The Voice) (“The eye is the lamp of the body. . . . [L]ight shines 
out to the world through your eyes.”). 
 202 See TURNER, supra note 196, at 4 (describing how humans can better take the measure of 
another when they can depend on verbal and nonverbal cues). Even when speaking with someone 
who is not present, we imagine what the other person would look like in-person as they speak. Id. 
at 51. 
 203 See id. at 34−35 (noting that the institutional environment affect interpersonal interac-
tions). 
 204 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.8031 (West 2010) (finding that visitation improves inmates’ 
comportment while incarcerated and helps reduce recidivism); Duwe & Clark, supra note 54, at 
289 (documenting the recidivism lowering benefits of inmates receiving visitors); Siennick, supra 
note 27, at 435 (finding that the risk an inmate commits a disciplinary infraction declines in the 
weeks preceding a visit); Chase Hoffeberger, Through a Glass, Darkly: County Jail Visitation 
Now Video-Only, AUSTIN CHRON. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2014-
11-07/through-a-glass-darkly/ [https://perma.cc/VC3R-9R59] (quoting an inmate advocate who 
stated that in-person visitation provides loved ones a means to assess an inmates condition). 
 205 See Siennick, supra note 27, at 435 (reporting the results of a study suggesting that in-
mates commit fewer infractions after receiving visits). 
 206 See Duwe & Clark, supra note 54, at 289 (reporting the results of a study suggesting that 
inmates who are visited are at a lower risk of recidivism). 
 207 See Leverson, supra note 10, at 409, 416, 420, 422−23 (noting that historically judges, and 
prison founders, reformers, and administrators supported public visitation of correctional institu-
tions because it could prevent abuse of inmates). 
 208 See Hampel, supra note 186 (quoting a mother concerned that video visitation prevents her 
from seeing if her son is getting enough to eat or has been injured); Hoffeberger, supra note 204 
(quoting an inmate advocate who stated that in-person visitation provides visitors a manner to 
assess the physical condition of an inmate so they may take action to address concerns). This is 
not to advocate for the position that prisons should be completely open to the public as they were 
in colonial times. See Leverson, supra note 10, at 415 (noting that prisons in colonial times were 
open to public inspection). 
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Policies eliminating in-person visitation can also perpetuate economic 
inequalities embedded in the correctional system.209 Video visitation can be 
expensive, while in-person visitation is typically free.210 Although some facil-
ities provide free video visits, often with restrictions, in others such visits can 
cost twenty dollars for a twenty minute conversation.211 Americans who are 
incarcerated are often already poor; their plight should not be aggravated for 
the benefit of private corporations by their attempts to connect with loved 
ones.212 Profiting from inmate contact with loved ones is “offensive to basic 
concepts of morality.”213 Furthermore, policies eliminating in-person visita-
tion resemble practices employed by slave owners, who viewed slaves as in-
capable of forming interpersonal connections.214 Such policies similarly send 
an implicit message that inmates’ relationships with family and friends are not 
valuable.215 
If video visitation is used at all, correctional officials should offer it in 
addition to, not instead of, in-person visitation.216 Supporters of in-person 
visitation include the U.S. Congress, the Council of Europe, the United Na-
tions, the American Bar Association, and the American Correctional Associa-
tion.217 Various newspapers’ editorial boards have directly condemned the 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 10 (commenting that families typically charged 
for video visitation are already poor); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 111 (noting that eliminating in-
person visitation leads to economic “subjugation” of inmates and their families). 
 210 See RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that in-person visitation is traditional-
ly free and quoting a county administrator stating that one dollar per minute for a video visit was 
an appropriate price); Fulcher, supra note 29, at 97 (documenting facilities that charge $15 for a 
thirty minute conversation and $20 for a twenty minute conversation). 
 211 RABUY & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 22−23; Fulcher, supra note 29, at 97. 
 212 Fulcher, supra note 29, at 111; see Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 21 (noting that the median 
income for an incarcerated man is almost twenty thousand dollars less than one who is not incar-
cerated). 
 213 Editorial, Idea Blackout: Paid Video Visits? Just a Bad Idea., HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 12, 
2014) [hereinafter Editorial, Idea Blackout], https://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/
Idea-blackout-5752156.php [https://perma.cc/RAR6-2ETB]. 
 214 See infra notes 44−49 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Bruce G. Link & Jo Phelan, Stigma Power, 103 SOC. SCI. & MED. 24, 25 (2014) (cit-
ing Pierre Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of 
Groups, 32 BERKELEY J. SOC. 1 (1987)) (exploring how power allows those with it to impose 
upon others their view of the social world and standing within that world, and noting that institu-
tional practices can contribute to keeping individuals down). 
 216 See Fulcher, supra note 29, at 103 (noting agreement among prisoner rights groups that 
video visitation should “supplement, not eliminate” in-person visitation). 
 217 See 42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(6) (2012) (stating that inmates who remain connected to loved 
ones while incarcerated are more likely to stay out of trouble while incarcerated and have shorter 
sentences) (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 60501); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS 23-8.5(e) (3d ed. 2011) (suggesting that inmates incarcerated for over thirty 
days be allowed in-person, preferably contact, visits); G.A. Res. 70/175 at 20 (Dec. 17, 2015) 
(requiring that prisoners have regular visits with family and friends); Council of Europe, Commit-
tee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 on the European Prison Rules, app. at rule 24.1, 
24.2 (Jan. 11, 2006), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805
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complete replacement of in-person visitation with video visitation.218 The 
question, then, is how to translate this broad consensus into correctional poli-
cy.219 
B. Judicial Remedy 
A constitutional challenge to a policy eliminating in-person visitation in 
favor of video visitation would be unlikely to succeed.220 The Supreme Court 
has never held that inmates have a right to remain in contact with, much less 
visit, loved ones.221 Several federal courts have alluded to such a visitation 
                                                                                                                           
d8d25 [https://perma.cc/PU97-U7GG] (recommending that prisoners be allowed to visits from 
outside persons and that restrictions should allow for an acceptable minimum level of contact); 
Am. Corr. Ass’n, Resolution: Supporting Family-Friendly Communication and Visitation Policies 
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/aca_member/ACA_Member/Govt_Public_
Affairs/PandR_FullText.aspx?PRCode=R0015 [https://perma.cc/HX58-8MB3] (resolving to commit 
the American Correctional Association to visitation “without added associated expenses or fees”). 
 218 Editorial, A Bad Idea to Cut Prison Visitations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/28/opinion/a-bad-idea-to-cut-prison-visitations.html [https://perma.cc/DDT4-
P57T]; Editorial, Banning In-Person Jail Visits Is Foolish and Needlessly Cruel, L.A. TIMES (May 
30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-video-jail-visits-20170530-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6JMU-CCCC]; Editorial, Idea Blackout, supra note 213; Editorial, Virtual Visits 
for Inmates?, WASH. POST (July 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virtual-
visits-for-inmates/2012/07/26/gJQAultJCX_story.html?utm_term=.6e26ae24f228 [https://perma.
cc/BL65-JDHP]. 
 219 See generally, supra notes 195–218 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003) (upholding prison regulation barring 
certain inmates from receiving non-contact visits because it furthered the legitimate penal objec-
tive of removing drugs from the institution); Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that it is “well-settled” that inmates do not have a constitutional right to contact 
visits). Courts have, however, struck down restrictions on in-person visitation for inmates with 
mental health problems. See, e.g., Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101, 1125 (W.D. 
Wis. 2001) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting mentally ill inmates from being housed at 
a facility where, among other things, visitation was restricted to video visitation and inmates were 
shackled during such visits); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 925 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (find-
ing that mental health prison unit’s visitation restrictions, including limiting visits to a half hour 
when the visiting room was crowded, to be “so extreme as to be not reasonably related to legiti-
mate interests in . . . security” and thus in violation of the inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (ordering prison 
mental health hospital inmates to have “unrestricted right to visitation, at all reasonable times”). 
Courts have tepidly considered the use of video visitation in other contexts, for example to resolve 
child custody disputes. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Gilbert, 730 N.W.2d 833, 840 (N.D. 2007) (instructing 
the district court to consider virtual visitation, including the use of a web-cam, to ensure important 
contact with the noncustodial parent, but noting that virtual visitation cannot substitute in-person 
visitation); Marshall v. Marshall, 814 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that although 
video visitation allows for some contact, “such technology cannot realistically be equated” with 
in-person contact between parents and young children). 
 221 See Overton, 539 U.S. at 131−32 (refusing to decide the extent to which incarceration 
affects inmates rights to visit with loved ones); Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 
2010) (commenting that the Supreme Court has not recognized an inmates’ right to visitation); see 
also Leverson, supra note 10, at 429 (noting that litigants have never presented the issue of 
whether there is a right of public access to prisons). But see, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 
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right on First Amendment grounds, but have stopped short of declaring its 
existence.222 
If an inmate launched a constitutional challenge to a policy replacing in-
person with video visitation, the inmate would bear the burden of disproving 
the validity of the policy.223 When analyzing a challenge to a visitation policy, 
federal courts first ask whether the policy is rationally related to a legitimate 
penal objective.224 Supreme Court precedent instructs courts to provide much 
credence to correctional officials’ policy determinations.225 In two cases deal-
ing with inmates’ challenges to visitation restrictions, the Court cited the 
goals of protecting visitors and curbing contraband as legitimate penological 
interests justifying the restrictions.226 
The concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Block v. Rutherford, that 
visitors may “be taken as hostages or become innocent pawns in escape at-
tempts,” are spurious.227 Escape attempts have declined despite growing in-
                                                                                                                           
558, 565 (7th Cir. 2001) (commenting that “[i]t is conceivable . . . that the constitutional concept 
of liberty” encompasses a “limited right” to have prison visits, but noting that an “electronic visit” 
may be the only form feasible for certain inmates); Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 688, 689 
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that there is “a well established tradition against holding prisoners incom-
municado in the United States” but finding the case law supporting this tradition “surprisingly 
scanty”). The Court has found that the Constitution protects, in some regards, “undue intrusion by 
the State” upon the “freedom of association,” which includes the ability to enter into and maintain 
some loving relationships. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617−18 (1984). 
 222 See, e.g., Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that, in a case 
challenging telephone use restrictions, the contested right “may be defined expansively as the First 
Amendment right to communicate with family and friends”); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 
(9th Cir. 1996) (stating that inmates have a First Amendment right to use the telephone, subject to 
security restrictions). 
 223 See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (affirming that the burden is on the inmate to disprove the 
validity of a regulation). 
 224 See id. (noting that whether a correctional regulation bears a rational relationship to a legit-
imate government interest is the first Turner factor). The existence of one is enough to sustain a 
challenged regulation. Id. at 131−32. 
 225 See supra notes 117−148 and accompanying text. 
 226 See Overton, 539 U.S. at 134 (citing the goal of decreasing drug use in prison); Block v. 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586−87 (1984) (citing the goal of decreasing contraband and increasing 
facility security). 
 227 Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 587; see Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting 
that the Arizona Department of Corrections had failed to cite a specific incident where a contact visit 
“resulted in assault, escape, or hostage-taking,” but concluding that, even so, banning contact visits 
was not irrational); Joseph Bernstein, Why Are Prison Riots Declining While Prison Populations 
Explode?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/
have-a-safe-riot/354671/ [https://perma.cc/T8QJ-DF2T] (noting that long prison riots are a rarity 
and that prison violence generally has decreased); Justin Wm. Moyer, New York Prison Break Just 
One of 2,000 Per Year, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2015/06/08/new-york-prison-escape-just-one-of-2000-per-year/?utm_term=.4f
c5a33b2f5a [https://perma.cc/3EY5-FJDR] (noting that the number of inmate escapes has diminished 
over the past two decades). Inmate visitors require protection from a more certain danger, the intru-
sive and humiliating searches conducted by corrections staff. See, e.g., Raven Rakia, “A Living 
Nightmare”: Women Visiting Loved Ones Jailed at Rikers Describe a Pattern of Invasive Searches 
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mate populations, and correctional officials have had difficulty demonstrating 
how visitors are implicated in escape attempts that do occur.228 The concern 
about contraband entering prisons through visitors, however, rests on less 
fickle ground.229 Visitors smuggle in contraband, but so do correctional em-
ployees, who are underpaid and can earn supplemental income by flouting 
facility rules and conspiring with inmates.230 There is, then, a legitimate con-
cern that visitors are one of several avenues through which contraband may 
enter correctional facilities.231 But prohibiting in-person visitation may para-
                                                                                                                           
by Guards, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 10, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/10/rikers-island-strip-
search-new-york-city-jails-visitors/ [https://perma.cc/QPB7-T5L9] (documenting invasive search-
es—including strip searches—of female visitors at New York correctional facilities). 
 228 See Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521 (describing how the Arizona Department of Corrections failed 
to cite a specific incident where a contact visit led to hostage-taking or an escape attempt); Moyer, 
supra note 227 (documenting that the number of state prison escapes has declined despite an in-
crease in state prison populations). In 1993, over fourteen thousand prisoners escaped. Id. In 2013, 
2,001 prisoners serving a sentence of one year or more escaped. Moyer, supra note 227. 
 229 See Matt Clarke, Contraband Smuggling a Problem at Prisons and Jails Nationwide, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jan/15/contraband-
smuggling-a-problem-at-prisons-and-jails-nationwide/ [https://perma.cc/96GJ-5A2E] (noting that 
prison employees and visitors are sources of contraband entering prisons). One manner visitors 
bring contraband into prison is by leaving it in the visiting areas, which are cleaned by inmates 
who retrieve the contraband and bring it into the facility. DeSoto County Jail Will Soon Only Al-
low Video Visitation, WMC5 (June 20, 2012), http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/18840159/
desoto-county-jail-will-soon-only-allow-video-visitation/ [https://perma.cc/PZ9V-WEDC]. New 
Hampshire prison officials justified policies limiting the amount of time a prisoner can hug a visi-
tor to three seconds and removing board games and vending machines from visiting rooms on the 
grounds that they created the risk of drugs entering the facility and causing overdoses. Rebecca 
Beitsch, Prisons Put New Limits on Inmate Visits to Stamp Out Drugs, PEW: STATELINE (May 30, 
2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/30/prisons-put-
new-limits-on-inmate-visits-to-stamp-out-drugs [https://perma.cc/GFQ7-XBXW]. Inmates re-
sponded by going on a hunger strike and starting a fire. Id. In 2015, a New Hampshire prison 
employee was caught sneaking sixty-seven thousand dollars’ worth of narcotics into a facility. Id. 
Approximately one percent of inmate deaths are caused by drugs and alcohol. Id. 
 230 See CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, PRISON CORRUPTION: THE PROB-
LEM AND SOME POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 1 (2016), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/public-integrity/files/prison_corruption_-_capi_community_contribution_-_sept
ember_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TU2-F6WG] (noting that corrupt prison guards are a source of 
illicit contraband and weapons entering prisons); Clarke, supra note 229 (listing inmates and cor-
rectional staff as potential drug couriers into facilities). It is difficult to eliminate contraband in 
prisons. See Beitsch, supra note 229 (citing a study in California that found that using scanners 
like those used at airports and drug-detection dogs did not significantly reduce the level of drugs 
in prisons). 
 231 Clarke, supra note 229. Inmates have proven to be resourceful in getting contraband into 
facilities. See, e.g., Tracy Samilton, Prisons Work to Keep Out Drug-Smuggling Drones, NPR (Nov. 
15, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/15/564272346/prisons-work-to-keep-out-drug-smuggling-
drones [https://perma.cc/9RGM-W9EJ] (reporting on the use of drones to drop cigarettes, cell 
phones, marijuana, and razor blades into prison yards in at least twelve states, and correctional offi-
cials’ efforts to stymie the drops). 
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doxically increase the availability of contraband.232 In Travis County, Texas, 
the number of disciplinary infractions for contraband rose by fifty-four per-
cent after prison officials replaced in-person visitation with video visita-
tion.233 
In-person visitation advances other penological objectives.234 Correc-
tional officials often justify policies restricting inmates’ rights on the grounds 
that they further the objectives of facility security and rehabilitation.235 Offi-
cials have also cited these goals in replacing in-person visitation with video 
visitation.236 As the discussion above illustrates, however, available research 
suggests that in-person visitation is beneficial for both.237 But in analyzing 
whether a policy bears a rational relationship to a correctional objective, 
courts do not balance competing objectives.238 Once a prison official invokes 
the objective of restricting contraband, a court could disregard the research 
supporting the benefits of in-person visitation, concluding that eliminating 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See RENAUD, supra note 56, at 4 (documenting that facility infractions for possession of 
contraband at one jail increased when in-person visitation was replaced with video visitation). If 
correctional officials were serious about addressing the contraband problem, at least as it applies 
to drugs, they would consider providing inmates with proven treatments, such as methadone and 
buprenorphine, which are used to treat opioid addiction and, for example, have been found to 
decrease drug addiction and recidivism rates at Rikers Island. Christine Vestal, At Rikers Island, a 
Legacy of Medication-Assisted Opioid Treatment, PEW: STATELINE (May 23, 2016), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/05/23/at-rikers-island-a-legacy-of-
medication-assisted-opioid-treatment [https://perma.cc/C8T6-5FCQ]. This, however, is not the 
favored approach in most American correctional facilities. See Dolovich, Incarceration American-
Style, supra note 44, at 245 (noting the dearth of efficient drug treatment in American prisons, 
despite the fact that a large number of inmates suffer from substance-use disorders). 
 233 RENAUD, supra note 56, at 4. 
 234 See, e.g., id. (noting that facility infractions for contraband increased when in-person visit-
ation was eliminated); Siennick, supra note 27, at 435 (finding that inmates have a lower likeli-
hood of committing a facility infraction during the weeks leading up to an in-person visit). 
 235 See, e.g., Overton, 539 U.S. at 129 (including rehabilitation as a legitimate penal interest 
threatened by drug and alcohol use by inmates in discussing why correctional officials decided to 
limit inmate visitation); Jones v. North Carolina, 433 U.S. 119, 132−33 (1977) (holding that a 
prison regulation banning unions was reasonable because correctional officials perceived it could 
threaten facility security). 
 236 See, e.g., Travis County Jail Visitation Is Now Video Visitation, TRAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
OFFICE (May 1, 2013), https://www.tcsheriff.org/about/press-releases/2013/118-travis-county-jail-
visitation-is-now-video-visitation [https://perma.cc/Y8AV-6F6X] (citing the “safety and security 
of the inmates and staff” as the primary reason for replacing in-person visitation with video visita-
tion). 
 237 See supra notes 54−60 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Overton, 539 U.S. at 131−32 (refusing to consider the extent that inmates have a right 
to association because the challenged regulation was rationally related to a legitimate penological 
interest); Hightower, 101 F.3d at 1384−85 (stating that once a rational relationship between a 
prison regulation and a legitimate penal interest is established the analysis ends). 
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such visits is rationally related to a correctional goal.239 Additionally, because 
the Supreme Court has commented that correctional officials need not support 
their policies with evidence, an official may justify banning in-person visita-
tion by simply alleging that it presents a “risk” to facility security.240 
Having found a rational relationship between a correctional policy and a 
correctional objective, courts then ask whether there are alternative means for 
inmates to express a right, whether the accommodation would impact other 
prison resources, and whether there are “ready alternatives” to the regula-
tion.241 A court could conclude that an alternative to in-person visitation is 
video visitation, which would still provide inmates with a means to connect 
with loved ones while potentially conserving correctional resources.242 
In sum, primarily because courts provide great deference to correctional 
authorities in establishing penal regulations, it is unlikely that a judicial rem-
edy is a viable path to relief.243 
C. Legislative Remedy 
Federal legislation mandating that federal facilities provide in-person 
visitation is necessary, but such legislation will be most impactful at the state 
level because that is where most inmates are held.244 A bill proposed in the 
                                                                                                                           
 239 Overton, 539 U.S. at 134 (upholding a regulation barring visitation for inmates with two 
substance-abuse demerits in part because it was rationally related to the legitimate penological 
goal of decreasing narcotic contraband in prison). 
 240 See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989) (commenting that although some-
thing is not “likely” to cause prison disorder, a prison official need only perceive a “risk” that it 
will to justify a regulation banning it); Jones, 433 U.S. at 132−33 (noting that prison officials must 
be given latitude to anticipate threats before “they can compile a dossier on the eve of a riot”); see 
also Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a showing by a 
prison official that regulated material “could lead to violence” was sufficient to establish a threat 
to prison security). 
 241 Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 
 242 See id. at 135 (finding that inmates barred from having in-person visits had alternative 
means of association with those they could not visit with, like communicating through those they 
were allowed to visit with). Additionally, if an inmate challenged being relocated from a facility 
offering in-person visitation to one offering only video visitation, that inmate would be unlikely to 
succeed because unfavorable conditions of confinement are not protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216, 225 (1976) (con-
cluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily protect 
inmates who are moved to a facility with worse conditions than their previous location); see also 
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 (1983) (holding that transferring an inmate from Hawaii 
to the mainland, where he was separated from his loved ones, was constitutionally permissible); 
Froehlich v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F.3d 800, 802 (7th. Cir. 1999) (concluding that there is not a 
constitutional right to “insist” that a loved one not be confined far away). 
 243 See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (noting that the Court defers to correctional officials’ deci-
sions). 
 244 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491−92 (1973) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to 
imagine an activity . . . more intricately bound up with state laws” than regulating correctional 
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2016 session of the U.S. House of Representatives serves as a useful model 
for state-level efforts because its plain language prohibits video visitation 
from replacing in-person visitation.245 The precedent-setting approaches of 
the California and Texas legislatures should not be imitated because, although 
beneficial, they allow facilities that have already eliminated in-person visita-
tion to maintain video-only visitation schemes.246 States seeking to follow in 
their wake should require all penal institutions, regardless of whether they 
have already eliminated in-person visitation, to allow for such visits.247 States 
should also adopt a provision noting the benefits of inmate visitation, as Flor-
ida has, so that the purpose of statutes requiring in-person visitation is 
clear.248 
D. Regulatory Remedy 
Regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and its state equivalents will likely need express statutory authority to 
limit video visitation and regulate the industry.249 Efforts to regulate the pris-
on phone industry without such authority have floundered.250 The proposed 
legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives also provides the FCC with 
regulatory authority over the video visitation industry.251 States should simi-
                                                                                                                           
institutions); CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 1 (reporting that in 2015 there were over 
1.5 million prisoners in the United States, fewer than 200,000 of whom were in federal custody). 
 245 Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 6441, 114th Congress (2016) (“Video visita-
tion may be used only to supplement, not supplant, in-person visitation.”). A recently passed law 
in Massachusetts has similarly clear language, and could also provide an example for other states 
to follow. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 36C (West Supp. 2019) (“A correctional institution 
. . . may use video . . . for inmate communication with visitors; provided, that such communica-
tions shall be in additions to and shall not replace in-person visitation . . . .”). 
 246 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4032(b), (d) (West Supp. 2019); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 511.009(a)(20), (a-1) (West Supp. 2018). 
 247 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, supra 
note 217, at 23-8.5(e) (recommending that prisoners confined for over thirty days be allowed to 
receive visits, preferably contact visits); Editorial, A Bad Idea to Cut Prison Visitations, supra 
note 218. 
 248 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.8031(1) (West 2010) (finding that visitation can “improve an 
inmate’s behavior in the correctional facility and . . . help reduce recidivism”). The Florida statute 
should be amended to explicitly note the benefits of in-person visits, not simply “visits,” which 
could be construed to be satisfied by video visitation. See id. (using the term “visits,” not “in-
person visits”). 
 249 See Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(finding that the Federal Communications Commission did not have authority under the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 to regulate the state prison phone industry); Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 968 A.2d 1047, 1049 (Me. 2009) (holding that the Maine Public Utilities Com-
mission lacked the express statutory authority to regulate the state’s prison telephone scheme). 
 250 See supra notes 166−181 and accompanying text. 
 251 H.R. 6441 (“[T]he Federal Communications Commission shall promulgate regulations 
with respect to video visitation services . . . .”). 
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larly provide state communications regulatory agencies with the power to 
regulate video visitation in prisons because it is unwise to allow correctional 
authorities to oversee themselves when they may have a financial interest in 
eliminating in-person visitation.252 
If Supreme Court precedent makes one thing clear, it is that correctional 
officials have nearly unbridled discretion in setting prison policies.253 The 
best path for preservation of in-person visitation, then, likely lies with 
them.254 Correctional officials should follow the lead of their colleagues who 
continue to offer in-person visitation, if anything along with low-cost, if not 
free, video visitation.255 
CONCLUSION 
Houses of correction in the United States are beginning to completely 
replace in-person visitation with video visitation. Such policies prevent effec-
tive communication between inmates and their loved ones, and could detract 
from the psychological, facility security, and recidivism benefits derived from 
in-person visitation. Federal judicial relief from such policies is unlikely, but 
legislators and correctional officials can influence policy at the state- and fa-
cility-level to maintain in-person visitation and preserve its benefits. 
ALEXANDRE BOU-RHODES 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 968 A.2d at 1050, 1051 (finding that the Maine 
Public Utilities Commission could not impose regulations upon the Department of Corrections, 
which has “broad authority” over prison regulations, without express statutory authority); Hampel, 
supra note 186 (quoting a county administrator who said a dollar a minute seemed like a “fair 
price” for a video visit because inmates are a captive audience). 
 253 See, e.g., Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (noting that courts must provide great deference to 
correctional officials’ determinations). 
 254 See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 186 (documenting a Mississippi sheriff who, following his 
election, re-instituted in-person visitation at the county jail after his predecessor had replaced it 
with video visitation). 
 255 See, e.g., id. (noting that the Illinois Department of Corrections plans to introduce video 
visitation, while maintaining in-person visitation as an option at its facilities); Sullivan, supra note 
190 (noting that King County, Washington recently installed a video visitation system while still 
allowing for in-person visits). 
